64 Attestation and Privacy Consider a device communicating with a server that wants assurance of the device’s identity, i.e. the server wants the device to authenticate itself. However, the device (more specifically, its user) may want privacy and therefore may require that the server only learns that the device is trusted. In principle, the problem could be solved by embedding a single secret key in every device and in the server, or using public-key cryptography with a single private key across all devices and a public key in the server. However, if any one device were compromised and the secret key extracted and published, the server would no longer be able to distinguish between real devices and fake ones. Intel’s Enhanced Privacy ID210 (EPID) is an enhancement of DAA that allows revocation of a private key given a signature created by that key, even if the key itself is still unknown. Also, each private key is actually a large set of key values, and a device can use a different key value in every transaction. This prevents anyone – including the manufacturer, the verifier, and the certificate authority – from tracing the key back to the root key or from identifying multiple transactions as emanating from the same device. EPID is the basis of Secure Device Onboard211 (SDO), a service developed by Intel that securely brings IoT devices online in an automated manner. SDO attests the device and connects it to the owner's IoT platform, and is supported by several IoT platform providers including AWS and Google. To address this, TCG initially proposed an intermediate certification authority called the Privacy CA, which has the obvious drawback that the Privacy CA 208 needs to be involved in every transaction and thus must be highly available and yet as secure as an ordinary CA that normally operates online. The newer Direct Anonymous Attestation (DAA) scheme is a digital signature algorithm supporting anonymity, allowing devices to uniquely authenticate themselves without the need for a Privacy CA . Unlike traditional digital signing, in which an entity has a public verification key corresponding to a single private signing key, DAA provides a common group public verification key associated with many unique private signing keys. DAA was created so that a device could prove its membership of a trusted group to an external party without needing to provide device identity. The DAA scheme was adopted by TCG as part of TPM 1.2.209 Firmware and Secure Boot When power is first switched on, a device is relatively dumb and can read only part of its storage called read-only memory (ROM) or firmware. For complex devices, the firmware (called Basic Input-Output System, or BIOS) typically initiates a multi-step procedure, calling code at the Master Boot Record (MBR) which in turn calls a bootloader to run a larger program such as an operating system. An alternative to BIOS is offered by the Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI); modern versions of Linux and Windows support UEFI with BIOS backward compatibility.212 208 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Direct_Anonymous_Attestation 209 https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/resource/tpm-main-specification/ 210 https://www.intel.com/content/dam/www/public/us/en/documents/whitepapers/intel-epid-iot-security-white-paper.pdf Simpler embedded devices often have (minimal) software systems entirely in ROM firmware or flash memory; little or no loading is necessary. Some designs may use an intermediate technique where minimal bootloader-like code is loaded into device RAM by the integrated boot ROM.213 211 https://www.intel.sg/content/www/xa/en/internet-of-things/secure-deviceonboard.html 212 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unified_Extensible_Firmware_Interface 213 https://www.embedded.com/design/mcus-processors-and-socs/4008796/2/ Fundamentals-of-Booting-for-Embedded-Processors

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