When Secure Boot is active, the UEFI firmware is responsible for verifying components such as drivers and bootloader. At commissioning, the device is initially placed in Setup Mode, which allows a public part of a Platform Key (PK) to be written to the firmware. The private part of the PK is used to sign a Key Exchange Key (KEK) which protects a signature database. Following this, Secure Boot enters User Mode, where only drivers and loaders whose signatures match the database can be loaded by the firmware. If an invalid binary is loaded while Secure Boot is enabled, the user is alerted, and the system will refuse to boot with the tampered binary. Additional signatures can be added to the database, but they must be signed by the private part of the KEK. While Secure Boot mitigates the problem of untrusted firmware, care must be taken in system design to protect secure boot databases. In addition, vendors must develop security processes to protect various signing keys and to sign only approved payloads218. 66 internet-connected devices that can be updated, controlled, monitored, and maintained remotely. 220 Specifically, the MCU’s Pluton Security Subsystem generates its own key pairs, implements a true random number generator (RNG), and accelerates cryptographic operations,221 enabling measured boot as well as remote attestation. Local Device Storage Stored data should always be protected with encryption222. Of course, a technique commonly used in IoT is to not store data locally but send it to a server where it can be easily encrypted. Having said that, some devices incorporate local self-encrypting drives (SEDs) that provide confidentiality while being easy to use and manage and having minimal impact on system performance. At the most basic level, SEDs provide hardware-based data security by continuously scrambling data using a key as it is written to the drive, and then descrambling the data as it is retrieved. The contents of an SED are always encrypted, and the encryption keys are themselves encrypted and protected in hardware that cannot be accessed by other parts of the system. Seven Properties of Highly Secured Devices Microsoft Research has identified seven properties219 that highly secured devices need to have: hardware based rootof-trust, small trusted computing base, defence in depth, compartmentalisation, certificate-based authentication, security renewal, and failure reporting. Microsoft’s Azure Sphere platform is designed around these properties, offering a secured, connected, crossover microcontroller unit (MCU), a custom high-level Linux-based operating system (OS), and a cloud-based security service. The Azure Sphere MCU, along with its operating system and application platform, enables the creation of secured, The SED standards223 from TCG enable encryption to be built into drives, improving security while avoiding the overhead of software encryption and ensuring that equipment can be cleansed for reuse simply by telling the drive to change its key. As with TPM, the SED standard is available in a wide variety of interoperable products, including hard drives, solid state drives, hybrid drives and enterprise storage systems, from a variety of vendors. SEDs are already in use in a number of devices, including printers, copiers and multi-function devices as well as point of sale systems. 218 http://www.rtcgroup.com/whitepapers/files/Insyde_Embedded_Secure_Boot. pdf 219 https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/research/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/ SevenPropertiesofHighlySecureDevices.pdf 220 https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure-sphere/product-overview/ what-is-azure-sphere 221 https://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/blog/anatomy-of-a-secured-mcu/ 222 https://www.gemalto.com/enterprise-security/enterprise-data-encryption 223 https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/resource/ storage-work-group-storage-security-subsystem-class-opal/

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