NCTV | Cyber Security Assessment Netherlands 2021
various parts of their ICT supply chains. This may generate
additional risks that are not properly identified. For example, risks
may arise due to the purchasing and public procurement of
products and services from an ICT supplier that provides a product
with a vulnerability or where a (temporary) staff member has access
to digital processes containing sensitive information. Breaches of
(the security of ) cyberspace are not merely a theoretical possibility
but are already taking place. Recently, additional sophisticated
attacks in ICT supply chains with a global impact came to light and
vulnerabilities in globally used products were exploited.
Chapter 5 discusses the risk of breaches of cyberspace in more
detail.
Resilience not yet sufficient
The National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) observes positive
developments when it comes to increasing the resilience of the
Netherlands: an increase in the use of multi-factor authentication,
the phasing out of a number of unsafe technologies, an
improvement in detection and response and, lastly, a wide range of
concrete initiatives to improve the resilience of organisations.
These positive developments notwithstanding, the cyber incidents
that recently hit the Netherlands show that resilience is not yet
sufficient (see chapter 2 ‘Retrospective’). In May 2021, the
Netherlands Court of Audit stated that the level of information
security throughout the central government had not changed in
2020. Virtually all organisations that lacked adequate information
security in 2019 took action in 2020 to address this. However, this
has not yet led to sufficient control of the risks, and consequently
the deficiencies have not yet been resolved. The Cyber Security
Council has concluded that additional efforts and investments will
be required in the Netherlands in the coming years to strengthen
resilience.
No or insufficient basic measures
One of the core messages in the CSANs in recent years has been
that no or insufficient basic measures are applied to counter the
digital threats, such as using strong passwords and prompt
patching to fix vulnerabilities. The incidents discussed in chapter 2
‘Retrospective’ show that too often, it is still the case that no or
insufficient basic measures are applied. Actors are quick to exploit
serious vulnerabilities in hardware and software and they often
continue to do so over long periods of time. They remain
successful on an ongoing basis in exploiting publicly known
vulnerabilities through cyber attacks on a global scale. The Dutch
intelligence services (the General Intelligence and Security Service
(AIVD) and the Military Intelligence and Security Service (MIVD))
have observed that state actors persist in exploiting publicly known
vulnerabilities to carry out digital attacks. An example of this is the
serious vulnerability in Citrix servers, which became known in
December 2019 and was exploited by various parties, including
10
state actors. At the time, the NCSC concluded that many Dutch
Citrix servers were also vulnerable to attacks. In June 2020, six
months after the vulnerability was publicised, an investigation by
Fox-IT showed there were still 39 compromised Citrix servers in the
Netherlands. Some of these servers were not promptly patched by
the relevant organisation, which means attackers could already
have installed a backdoor and made digital processes inaccessible
or gained unauthorised access to information. In the case of the
vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange that were publicised in early
March 2021, it was also found that organisations had not promptly
patched vulnerable servers. The NCSC warned that the
vulnerabilities would be exploited, resulting in data being stolen
and criminals installing malware and backdoors and selling emails.
This will enable them to carry out new attacks or to hit digital
processes in the near future; for example, through identity fraud
based on captured personal data.
Several incidents illustrate that there is a systemic time lag between
the moment when critical vulnerabilities are publicised and the
(subsequent) implementation of security updates. As a result,
Dutch companies, organisations and ministries run an increased
risk of digital espionage by state actors.
The NCSC product ‘Guide to Cybersecurity Measures’ lists the most
important basic measures.
Considerable differences in the area of resilience
Cybersecurity experts observe considerable differences in levels of
resilience in the Netherlands. Large companies can invest in
knowledge and skills in the field of cybersecurity. Suppliers of
essential services and digital service providers also have a statutory
duty of care, laid down in the Network and Information Systems
Security Act (Wet beveiliging netwerk- en informatiesystemen, Wbni).
Small businesses, on the other hand, including small and mediumsized enterprises (SMEs), often lack the expertise and resources to
take resilience to the next level. Yet SMEs can also be targeted by
sophisticated actors. For example, the MIVD stated that in the
Netherlands, the EXIM vulnerability which the US intelligence
service NSA warned about had also been exploited by a state actor
to compromise victims in the SME sector. Furthermore, vulnerable
SMEs can be part of the supply chains of critical processes. SMEs are
increasingly dependent on IT service providers, but they do not
always have adequate basic security measures; for example, it is
often unclear who is responsible for updates or back-ups. This
makes digital processes vulnerable to all kinds of abuse. Experts
fear that the differences in the level of resilience will further
increase in the coming years. To reduce these differences, various
initiatives have been launched to provide public and private parties
with information and to work together to increase resilience. In
this context, the NCSC serves as the national information exchange
within the Nation-Wide System.
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