NCTV | Cyber Security Assessment Netherlands 2021 various parts of their ICT supply chains. This may generate additional risks that are not properly identified. For example, risks may arise due to the purchasing and public procurement of products and services from an ICT supplier that provides a product with a vulnerability or where a (temporary) staff member has access to digital processes containing sensitive information. Breaches of (the security of ) cyberspace are not merely a theoretical possibility but are already taking place. Recently, additional sophisticated attacks in ICT supply chains with a global impact came to light and vulnerabilities in globally used products were exploited. Chapter 5 discusses the risk of breaches of cyberspace in more detail. Resilience not yet sufficient The National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) observes positive developments when it comes to increasing the resilience of the Netherlands: an increase in the use of multi-factor authentication, the phasing out of a number of unsafe technologies, an improvement in detection and response and, lastly, a wide range of concrete initiatives to improve the resilience of organisations. These positive developments notwithstanding, the cyber incidents that recently hit the Netherlands show that resilience is not yet sufficient (see chapter 2 ‘Retrospective’). In May 2021, the Netherlands Court of Audit stated that the level of information security throughout the central government had not changed in 2020. Virtually all organisations that lacked adequate information security in 2019 took action in 2020 to address this. However, this has not yet led to sufficient control of the risks, and consequently the deficiencies have not yet been resolved. The Cyber Security Council has concluded that additional efforts and investments will be required in the Netherlands in the coming years to strengthen resilience. No or insufficient basic measures One of the core messages in the CSANs in recent years has been that no or insufficient basic measures are applied to counter the digital threats, such as using strong passwords and prompt patching to fix vulnerabilities. The incidents discussed in chapter 2 ‘Retrospective’ show that too often, it is still the case that no or insufficient basic measures are applied. Actors are quick to exploit serious vulnerabilities in hardware and software and they often continue to do so over long periods of time. They remain successful on an ongoing basis in exploiting publicly known vulnerabilities through cyber attacks on a global scale. The Dutch intelligence services (the General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD) and the Military Intelligence and Security Service (MIVD)) have observed that state actors persist in exploiting publicly known vulnerabilities to carry out digital attacks. An example of this is the serious vulnerability in Citrix servers, which became known in December 2019 and was exploited by various parties, including 10 state actors. At the time, the NCSC concluded that many Dutch Citrix servers were also vulnerable to attacks. In June 2020, six months after the vulnerability was publicised, an investigation by Fox-IT showed there were still 39 compromised Citrix servers in the Netherlands. Some of these servers were not promptly patched by the relevant organisation, which means attackers could already have installed a backdoor and made digital processes inaccessible or gained unauthorised access to information. In the case of the vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange that were publicised in early March 2021, it was also found that organisations had not promptly patched vulnerable servers. The NCSC warned that the vulnerabilities would be exploited, resulting in data being stolen and criminals installing malware and backdoors and selling emails. This will enable them to carry out new attacks or to hit digital processes in the near future; for example, through identity fraud based on captured personal data. Several incidents illustrate that there is a systemic time lag between the moment when critical vulnerabilities are publicised and the (subsequent) implementation of security updates. As a result, Dutch companies, organisations and ministries run an increased risk of digital espionage by state actors. The NCSC product ‘Guide to Cybersecurity Measures’ lists the most important basic measures. Considerable differences in the area of resilience Cybersecurity experts observe considerable differences in levels of resilience in the Netherlands. Large companies can invest in knowledge and skills in the field of cybersecurity. Suppliers of essential services and digital service providers also have a statutory duty of care, laid down in the Network and Information Systems Security Act (Wet beveiliging netwerk- en informatiesystemen, Wbni). Small businesses, on the other hand, including small and mediumsized enterprises (SMEs), often lack the expertise and resources to take resilience to the next level. Yet SMEs can also be targeted by sophisticated actors. For example, the MIVD stated that in the Netherlands, the EXIM vulnerability which the US intelligence service NSA warned about had also been exploited by a state actor to compromise victims in the SME sector. Furthermore, vulnerable SMEs can be part of the supply chains of critical processes. SMEs are increasingly dependent on IT service providers, but they do not always have adequate basic security measures; for example, it is often unclear who is responsible for updates or back-ups. This makes digital processes vulnerable to all kinds of abuse. Experts fear that the differences in the level of resilience will further increase in the coming years. To reduce these differences, various initiatives have been launched to provide public and private parties with information and to work together to increase resilience. In this context, the NCSC serves as the national information exchange within the Nation-Wide System.

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