Chapter 2 Retrospective | CSAN 2021 State actors actively scanning for vulnerable VPN systems State actors are actively seeking vulnerable VPN systems in networks of both (semi-) public and private parties. Vulnerable systems can also be used at a later time to launch a larger attack, on the entire chain for example. The NCSC received reports from various sectors about observed scanning activities and that some organisations were vulnerable, but that no exploitation had taken place. Foreign CERTs have also observed increased scanning activity for VPN vulnerabilities in the period March 2020 to March 2021. The following VPN vulnerabilities, among others, have been frequently exploited to gain access to a system: Pulse Connect Secure (CVE-2019-11510), Fortigate SSL (CVE-2018-13379, CVE2018-13382 and CVE-2018-13383) and Citrix ADC (CVE-2019-19781). Meanwhile, patches exist for these VPN vulnerabilities and several warnings and control measures have been published. Nevertheless, there are still organisations in the Netherlands that use vulnerable VPN solutions. Organisations in the SME sector in particular have not yet resolved the vulnerabilities. There is also a fourth (unofficial) category of remote working facilities: shadow ICT; solutions that are not part of the approved office applications, but which are used for work-related purposes. Examples are messaging apps, private email and private cloud applications. This category has also gained in importance because, as a result of COVID-19, there was a need for workarounds to quickly share information and documents. In November 2020, in a report on safe working from home, the Court of Audit pointed out the serious security risks that the use of shadow ICT can entail. 2.3 Deliberately denying access to processes There are many ways to deliberately deny access to processes. The two most important are disruption with a DDoS attack and the use of ransomware. DDoS: bigger, heavier and longer lasting attacks In the reporting period, digital processes of Internet Service Providers (ISPs), the financial sector, education and public organisations were affected by DDoS attacks. Notable was the trend towards heavier and more complex attacks combining multiple attack vectors. Exceptionally heavy DDoS attacks were carried out in the month of August 2020 with peaks of up to 260 Gigabits per second. The attacks mainly targeted the shared infrastructure at ISPs. In a number of cases, not only customers experienced disruptions in their online services, but also the providers themselves. In its annual DDoS data report, the Dutch Internet Providers Management Organisation states that DDoS attacks have become more powerful and complex in 2020, while the number and duration of DDoS attacks has also increased. Attackers are said to have above-average skills. They target the underlying infrastructure and the attackers often change misused protocols, which makes defending difficult. Despite this, the Anti-DDoS Coalition says that through cooperation, it has been able to limit the consequences of the DDoS attacks in the Netherlands. DDoS has traditionally been the tool of cyber vandals or individuals who launch attacks out of frustration with the target organisation. There is also the phenomenon of RDDoS (Ransom Distributed Denial-of-Service): extortion using a DDoS attack as a means of applying pressure. Worldwide warnings were issued about DDoS extortion emails sent to financial institutions in various states, including the Netherlands. Several providers suffered DDoS attacks; but no major disruptions In August 2020, several Dutch providers experienced DDoS attacks. Several providers were temporarily taken down as a result. In the case of a provider from the province of Zeeland, the attack meant that internet, TV and telephony were unavailable in large parts of the province for some time. This also caused a regional PIN malfunction. Ransomware leads to inaccessible processes and irreversible damage During the reporting period, actors held key systems hostage with ransomware attacks. As a result, digital processes of public organisations, among others, (largely) came to a standstill and irreversible damage was caused to ICT systems. The method used to perpetrate ransomware attacks has changed significantly in recent years. There has been a move towards Big Game Hunting, compromising carefully selected organisations. These are usually wealthy organisations, responsible for continuity of processes or in possession of unique data. The pressure on the victim is greatly increased by the ransomware being deployed at the most strategic location in the network. In addition, the means of applying pressure has also changed. Where initially data or systems were encrypted, now data is also stolen and threatened to be made public. This is why data breaches are regularly seen as significant collateral damage in ransomware attacks. There are also examples of actors who accompany a ransomware attack with a threat of a DDoS attack as an additional means of applying pressure. According to the FBI, telephone threats with physical visits to the home are also occurring in ransomware attacks. The combination of these strategies poses an increased risk to organisations where many people depend on, where unique and high-quality knowledge is generated and where responsibility for processing 19

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