Compared to a violation of sovereignty, the requirement of coercive nature and that of domaine réservé make the threshold of prohibited intervention considerably higher. This underlines the importance of continued understanding of sovereignty as not only a principle but also an independent primary rule of international law. Transboundary harm Another cardinal principle flowing from sovereignty, closely related to the obligation to respect the sovereignty of other States, is each State’s obligation not to knowingly allow its territory to be used to cause significant harm to the rights of other States. It is widely recognized that this principle, often referred to as due diligence, is applicable to any activity which involves the risk of causing significant transboundary harm.16 Due diligence is a variable standard in the sense that its content can change over time as a result of technological development or changes in risk assessment,17 and as such fully applicable to cyber operations. States may thus not knowingly allow their territory, or cyber infrastructure within a territory under their control, to be used to cyber operations that produce serious adverse consequences for other States. While only States can violate sovereignty, the sovereignty-based obligation of due diligence extends to private activities taking place in a State’s territory. Significant harm caused to other States by private cyber activities may give rise to a State’s international responsibility but only if the State in question has breached its due diligence obligations. Some legal obligations are inherent in the principle of due diligence and apply to cyber activities even in the absence of cyber-specific elaborations of the principle. For instance, if a State knows about a planned cyber activity in its territory likely to affect another State adversely and seriously, it must notify that other State. In addition to actual knowledge of harmful acts emanating from the territory of a State, a State’s responsibility may be engaged in situations in which it should have known about the activities in question. It is nevertheless clear that “it cannot be concluded from the mere fact of the control exercised […] over its territory […] that [a] State necessarily knew, or ought to have known, of any unlawful act perpetrated therein”.18 If harmful cyber activity takes place and causes serious harm to another State, the State of origin must take appropriate action to terminate it, as well as to investigate the incident and bring those responsible to justice. In order to be able to do this, States should have the necessary procedural 16 International Law Commission, Draft Articles on the Prevention of transboundary harm from hazardous activities, art. 3: "The State of origin shall take all appropriate measures to prevent significant transboundary harm or at any event to minimize the risk thereof", Yearbook… 2001, vol. II (Part Two), pp. 144–170; International Law Association, Second Report on Due Diligence in International Law, July 2016, p. 6: “This broad principle of due diligence can be understood as underlying more specific rules of due diligence. Hence, it can be viewed as a default standard that is triggered in operation if no more specific elaboration of due diligence or stricter standard is in existence.” 17 International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, Seabed Disputes Chamber, Responsibilities and Obligations of States Sponsoring Persons and Entities with Respect to Activities in the Area, Advisory opinion, 1 February 2011, List of Cases: No. 17, para. 117. 18 International Court of Justice, Corfu Channel case, Judgment of April 9th, 1949, I.C.J. Reports 1949, p.4, at 18. 4

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