adjustment. For instance, it may be possible to attribute a hostile cyber operation only afterwards
whereas countermeasures normally should be taken while the wrongful act is ongoing.
There is no general obligation for a State taking countermeasures to disclose the information on
the basis of which the action is taken. At the same time, it is in each State’s best interests to
ensure that a decision to take countermeasures is based on solid evidence, given that recourse
to countermeasures would otherwise constitute an internationally wrongful act. A State that
responds to a hostile cyber operation must therefore have adequate proof of the source of the
operation and convincing evidence of the responsibility of a particular State.
Public attribution, as a sovereign choice, is primarily a question of political consideration. Public
attribution may nevertheless have legal effects to the extent it includes determinations of
conduct that constitutes an internationally wrongful act.
In addition to countermeasures, other circumstances precluding wrongfulness may justify taking
of cyber measures that would otherwise constitute an internationally wrongful act.22 This may
be the case, for instance, if deviating from an international obligation is the only way for the State
to safeguard an essential interest against a grave and imminent peril. Facing such an exceptional
situation, a State may deviate from its international obligations within the limits specified in the
law of State responsibility.23
Use of force/ armed attack
While there is currently no established definition of a cyberattack that would pass the threshold
of “use of force” in the sense of article 2(4) of the UN Charter, or “armed attack” in the sense of
article 51, it is widely recognized that such a qualification depends on the consequences of a
cyberattack. For a cyberattack to be comparable to use of force, it must be sufficiently serious
and have impacts in the territory of the target State, or in areas within its jurisdiction, that are
similar to those of the use of force. A threat of such a cyberattack could also violate Article 2(4)
of the Charter, if the threat is sufficiently precise and directed against another State.
Similarly, most commentators agree that when the scale and effects of a cyberattack correspond
to those of an armed attack responding to the cyberattack is justifiable as self-defence. It is
obvious that the attack must have caused death, injury or substantial material damage, but it is
impossible to set a precise quantitative threshold for the effects, and other circumstantial factors
must be taken into account in the analysis, as well. A widely discussed question is, to what extent
the definition of a cyberattack comparable to an armed attack should take account of the indirect
and long-term impacts of the attack. In any case, this would require that the impacts can be
assessed with sufficient precision. A question has also been raised, whether a cyberattack
producing significant economic effects such as the collapse of a State’s financial system or parts
of its economy should be equated to an armed attack. This question merits further consideration.
22
23
ARSIWA, Chapter V, Circumstances precluding wrongfulness.
Ibid., art. 25. See also Tallinn Manual 2.0, Rule 26.
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