18. Warren Harrison, George Heuston, Mark Morrissey, Aucsmith & Sarah Mocas, “A Lesson Learned Repository for Computer Forensics,” International Journal of Digital Evidence, Vol. 1, Issue 3 (2002). 19. Ruibin & Gaertner, supra § 2 C, note 32. 20. ITU Understanding Cybercrime, supra § 1 B, note 1. 21. Nolan et al., supra § 2 C, note 42, at 171. 22. Regarding the challenges of encryption, see § 1 D; see also Siegfried, supra note 17. 23. Regarding possible counter strategies for law enforcement, see J. Alex Halderman, Seth D. Schoen, Nadia Heninger et al., Lest We Remember: Cold Boot Attacks on Encryption Keys, Proc. 17th USENIX Security Symposium, (San Jose, CA, Jul. 2008), at http://citp.princeton.edu/ memory. 24. Nolan et al., supra § 2 C, note 42, at 88. 25. Vaciago, supra § 2 C, note 33. 26. See Vacca, supra § 2 C, note 44, at 43; Robert Moore, “To View or Not to View: Examining the Plain View Doctrine and Digital Evidence,” American Journal of Criminal Justice, Vol. 29, No. 1 (2004), p. 59. 27. Moore, ibid., at 58. 28. Lange & Nimsger, supra § 2 C, note 14, at 6; Gary Gordon, Chet Hosmer, Christine Siedsma & Don Rebovich, Assessing Technology, Methods, and Information for Committing and Combating Cyber Crime, (Washingtong, DC: US Dept. of Justice, Jan. 2003), p. 38, at https://www.ncjrs.gov/ pdffiles1/nij/grants/198421.pdf. 29. Ibid. 30. Consider, for instance, the issue of the FBI attempting to unlock a recovered Apple iPhone. See supra § 1 B, case 1.3. 31. Casey, supra note 17. 32. Lange & Nimsger, supra § 2 C, note 16, at 473; Gordon et al., supra note 28; Marco Gercke, “Challenges Related to the Fight against Cybercrime,” Multimedia und Recht, (2008), p. 297. 33. See, e.g., Vindu Goel, “Encryption Is More Important, and Easier, Than Ever By,” New York Times, (14 Oct. 2015), at http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/10/14/ encryption-is-more-important-and-easierthan-ever/?_r=0. Page 152 | Chapter 2 | End Notes 34. Siegfried, supra note 17. Regarding the decryption process in forensic investigations, see Gordon et al., supra note 28, at 59. 35. Ibid. Regarding the forensic software magic lantern, developed as a keylogger used by law enforcement in the United States, see Christopher Woo and Miranda So, “The Case for Magic Lantern, Highlights the Need for Increased Surveillance,” Harvard Journal of Law & Technology, Vol. 15, No. 2 (2002), p. 521 et seq.; Spyware: Background and Policy issues for Congress, US Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report, (2007), p. 3; Thomas Green, “FBI Magic Lantern reality check,” Register, (12 Mar. 2001), at www.theregister.co.uk/2001/12/03/ fbi_magic_lantern_reality_check/; Alex Salkever, “A Dark Side to the FBI’s Magic Lantern,” Bloomberg, (27 Nov. 2001), at https://www.bloomberg.com/news/ articles/2001-11-26/a-dark-side-to-thefbis-magic-lantern; Bob Sullivan, “FBI Software Cracks Encryption Wall,” NBC News, (20 Nov. 2001), at http://www. nbcnews.com/id/3341694/ns/technology_ and_science-security/t/fbi-softwarecracks-encryption-wall; Elinor Abreu, “FBI Confirms ‘Magic Lantern’ Project Exists,” Rense, (13 Dec. 2001), at http://www. rense.com/general17/FBIconfirmsmagic. htm. 36. See infra § 3 B for discussion informal international cooperation encouraging information sharing and coordination centers. 37. Regarding the plans of German lawenforcement agencies to develop a software to remotely access a suspect’s computer and perform search procedures, see John Blau, “Debate Rages over German Government Spyware Plan,” Infoworld, (5 Sep. 2007), at http:// www.infoworld.com/article/2649377/ security/debate-rages-over-germangovernment-spyware-plan.html; Anne Broache, “Germany Wants to Sic Spyware on Terror Suspects,” CNet News, (31 Aug. 2007), at https://www.cnet.com/news/ germany-wants-to-sic-spyware-on-terrorsuspects. 38. Erin Kenneally, “Confluence of Digital Evidence and the Law: On the Forensic Soundness of Live-Remote Digital Evidence Collection,” UCLA Journal of Law & Technology, Vol. 9, No. 2 (2005). 39. See Vacca, supra § 2 C, note 42, at 52. 41. Kerr, supra note 17, at p. 538. 42. “Computer Forensics Tool Testing Project,” National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), at http://www.cftt. nist.gov. 43. Moore, supra note 26, at 58. 44. See Casey, supra § 2 C, note 49, at 16; Vacca, supra § 2 C, note 44, at 39. 45. Chet Hosmer, “Proving the Integrity of Digital Evidence with Time,” International Journal of Digital Evidence, Vol. 1, No. 1 (2001), p. 1, at www.utica.edu/ academic/institutes/ecii/publications/ articles/9C4EBC25-B4A3-6584-C38C5 11467A6B862.pdf. 46. Whitcomb, supra note 13. 47. Regarding the related procedural instrument, see Art. 19.3, Budapest Convention, supra § 1 B, note 32. 48. The bit-streaming method consecutively duplicates digital data in its minimum unit–bit. This method enables replication of all data, including those hidden or deleted from the original storage device. 49. Korea: “Rule on the Collection and Analysis of Evidence by Digital Forensic Investigator,” at http://www.law.go.kr/ main.html (in Korean). 50. ITU Understanding Cybercrime, supra § 1 B, note 1, at 251–79. 51. See Nolan et al., supra § 2 C, note 42, at 12. 52. Tom Talleur, “Digital Evidence: The Moral Challenge,” International Journal of Digital Evidence, Vol. 1, Issue 1 (2002), p. 1 et seq., at https://www.utica.edu/ academic/institutes/ecii/publications/ articles/9C4E398D-0CAD-4E8DCD2D38F31AF079F9.pdf; Eoghan Casey, “Error, Uncertainty, and Loss in Digital Evidence,” International Journal of Digital Evidence, Vol. 1, Issue 2 (2002), at www.utica.edu/academic/institutes/ecii/ publications/articles/A0472DF7-ADC97FDE-C80B5E5B306A85C4.pdf. 53. See UNODC Cybercrime Study, supra § 2 C, note 42, at 39 et seq.; Nolan et al., supra § 2 C, note 42, at 85; Gordon, supra note 28, at 41 et seq. 54. Ruibin & Gaertner, supra note 13. 55. Gordon, supra note 28, at 62. 40. See, e.g., “About Us,” American Board of Criminalistics, at http://www.criminalistics. com/. Table of Contents

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