63. While not specific to the abovementioned three multilateral treaties on cybercrime with fast means of communications for urgent MLA requests, UNODC provides as follows, “Being party to an international or regional instrument envisaging urgent mutual legal assistance channels appears to have a moderate effect – 55 percent of responding countries that were not party to any multilateral cybercrime instrument did not have channels for urgent requests, compared with 40 per cent of countries that were party to a multilateral cybercrime instrument.” See also UNODC Cybercrime Study, supra § 1 C, note 7, at 207–208. 64. Budapest Convention, supra § 1 B, note 32, at Preamble. 65. Ibid., at Art. 22.3. With regard to offenses committed by the national of a state, the Convention is only applicable if the offense is criminally punishable where committed, or if the offense is committed outside the territorial jurisdiction of any state (thereby avoiding the possibility of negative jurisdiction). Ibid., at Art. 22.3.d. 66. Ibid., at Art.22.4. 67. Ibid., at Art. 14–15 (discussing the scope of, and safeguards for, these tools). 68. States bound by the European Convention on Human Rights violate their duty to their citizens and victims’ human rights if privacy laws prevent law enforcement authorities from conducting adequate electronic investigations in criminal cases. K.U. v. Finland, 2872/02 [2008] ECtHR 1563, at http://www. echr.coe.int/Documents/Reports_ Recueil_2008-V.pdf. Although this is a ECtHR decision, it is instructive for other regions. 69. Budapest Convention, supra § 1 B, note 32, at Art. 25. 70. See, e.g., ibid., at Art. 22 & 24 (especially noting at Art. 24.1.3, “If a Party that makes extradition conditional on the existence of a treaty receives a request for extradition from another Party with which it does not have an extradition treaty, it may consider this Convention as the legal basis for extradition with respect to any criminal offence referred to in paragraph 1 of this article.”). 72. “The Obligation to Extradite or Prosecute” (“aut dedere aut judicare”), Final Report of the UN International Law Commission, (2014), at http:// legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/ english/reports/7_6_2014.pdf; Budapest Convention, supra § 1 B, note 32, at Art. 24.6. See also Budapest Explanatory Report, supra § 1 D, note 14, at para. 251. 73. See, e.g., Urbas, supra § 2 E, note 53, at 13–14. 74. European Convention on Extradition, Paris, ETS No. 24 (13 Dec. 1957), Arts. 3 & 11, at https://www.coe.int/en/web/ conventions/full-list/-/conventions/ treaty/024. 75. See, e.g., Lazar, supra § 2 B, case 2.2. 76. See, e.g., Budapest Convention, supra § 1 B, note 32, at Art. 24. Dual criminality is intended to protect individuals from state persecution for political crimes. 77. Ibid., at Art. 22 & 24. 78. Ibid., at Art. 24.1.b. 79. See Budapest Explanatory Report, supra § 1 D, note 14, at para. 245. 80. Ibid. 81. Budapest Convention, supra § 1 B, note 32, at Art. 24.1. 82. Amalie M. Weber, “The Council of Europe’s Convention on Cybercrime,” Berkeley Technology Law Journal, Vol. 18 (2003), p. 426, at http://scholarship.law. berkeley.edu/btlj/vol18/iss1/28. 83. See, e.g., Statement of US Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales on the Passage of the Cybercrime Convention, US Dept. of Justice, at http://www.justice. gov/archive/opa/pr/2006/August/06_ ag_499.html (“This treaty provides important tools in the battles against terrorism, attacks on computer networks and the sexual exploitation of children over the Internet, by strengthening U.S. cooperation with foreign countries in obtaining electronic evidence.”). 84. Walden, supra § 2 A, note 67. 71. Oxford Dictionary of Law. Page 220 | Chapter 5 | End Notes Table of Contents

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