63. While not specific to the abovementioned three multilateral treaties
on cybercrime with fast means of
communications for urgent MLA requests,
UNODC provides as follows, “Being
party to an international or regional
instrument envisaging urgent mutual
legal assistance channels appears to
have a moderate effect – 55 percent of
responding countries that were not party
to any multilateral cybercrime instrument
did not have channels for urgent
requests, compared with 40 per cent of
countries that were party to a multilateral
cybercrime instrument.” See also UNODC
Cybercrime Study, supra § 1 C, note 7, at
207–208.
64. Budapest Convention, supra § 1 B, note
32, at Preamble.
65. Ibid., at Art. 22.3. With regard to offenses
committed by the national of a state,
the Convention is only applicable if the
offense is criminally punishable where
committed, or if the offense is committed
outside the territorial jurisdiction of any
state (thereby avoiding the possibility of
negative jurisdiction). Ibid., at Art. 22.3.d.
66. Ibid., at Art.22.4.
67. Ibid., at Art. 14–15 (discussing the scope
of, and safeguards for, these tools).
68. States bound by the European
Convention on Human Rights violate
their duty to their citizens and victims’
human rights if privacy laws prevent law
enforcement authorities from conducting
adequate electronic investigations in
criminal cases. K.U. v. Finland, 2872/02
[2008] ECtHR 1563, at http://www.
echr.coe.int/Documents/Reports_
Recueil_2008-V.pdf. Although this is a
ECtHR decision, it is instructive for other
regions.
69. Budapest Convention, supra § 1 B, note
32, at Art. 25.
70. See, e.g., ibid., at Art. 22 & 24 (especially
noting at Art. 24.1.3, “If a Party that makes
extradition conditional on the existence of
a treaty receives a request for extradition
from another Party with which it does not
have an extradition treaty, it may consider
this Convention as the legal basis for
extradition with respect to any criminal
offence referred to in paragraph 1 of this
article.”).
72. “The Obligation to Extradite or
Prosecute” (“aut dedere aut judicare”),
Final Report of the UN International
Law Commission, (2014), at http://
legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/
english/reports/7_6_2014.pdf; Budapest
Convention, supra § 1 B, note 32, at Art.
24.6. See also Budapest Explanatory
Report, supra § 1 D, note 14, at para. 251.
73. See, e.g., Urbas, supra § 2 E, note 53, at
13–14.
74. European Convention on Extradition,
Paris, ETS No. 24 (13 Dec. 1957), Arts.
3 & 11, at https://www.coe.int/en/web/
conventions/full-list/-/conventions/
treaty/024.
75. See, e.g., Lazar, supra § 2 B, case 2.2.
76. See, e.g., Budapest Convention, supra §
1 B, note 32, at Art. 24. Dual criminality is
intended to protect individuals from state
persecution for political crimes.
77. Ibid., at Art. 22 & 24.
78. Ibid., at Art. 24.1.b.
79. See Budapest Explanatory Report, supra §
1 D, note 14, at para. 245.
80. Ibid.
81. Budapest Convention, supra § 1 B, note
32, at Art. 24.1.
82. Amalie M. Weber, “The Council of
Europe’s Convention on Cybercrime,”
Berkeley Technology Law Journal, Vol. 18
(2003), p. 426, at http://scholarship.law.
berkeley.edu/btlj/vol18/iss1/28.
83. See, e.g., Statement of US Attorney
General Alberto R. Gonzales on the
Passage of the Cybercrime Convention,
US Dept. of Justice, at http://www.justice.
gov/archive/opa/pr/2006/August/06_
ag_499.html (“This treaty provides
important tools in the battles against
terrorism, attacks on computer networks
and the sexual exploitation of children
over the Internet, by strengthening U.S.
cooperation with foreign countries in
obtaining electronic evidence.”).
84. Walden, supra § 2 A, note 67.
71. Oxford Dictionary of Law.
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