The traditional search-and-seizure approach focuses on collecting and cataloging physical material. Due to rapid developments in cyberspace, however, most evidence, though stored on physical devices, exists only in a digital format. Legal authority and good practices for executing search and seizure warrants varies considerably between jurisdictions and criminal justice systems, especially with regard to rules governing handling e-evidence.7 As such, it is incumbent upon investigators to consider the appropriateness of previewing and forensically acquiring data at the scene and whether the circumstances may justify physically seizing equipment for further analysis in a laboratory.8 Retrieving such information requires augmented investigatory approaches, as well as different evidence-handling techniques.9 The first major procedural issue in pursuing cybercrimes is legislative: procedural law must be changed or adapted to authorize investigators to search and seize computer information, and not only tangible evidence.10 This process presents its own complications. For example, while the United States first drafted procedural laws for authorities to access electronic communications in 1986, law makers at the time only had the telephone in mind, and, accordingly, drafted a limited law specifying that it applied to telephone-related crimes.11 The law soon became outdated and had to be amended to include other existing and anticipated forms of electronic communication; however, that process of revision caused delay and hindrances, and was only done following the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001.12 Computer information, or data,13 is information that is either stored in a storage device, or which is in transit across virtual networks (see section 2 A, above). First responders investigating cybercrime frequently seize all relevant devices.14 However, as the storage capacity of ICT devices has grown—and continues to grow—exponentially,15 and as the nature of digital documents continues to diversify, much of the information stored on any given device is ordinary business material or private information lacking any investigatory relevance. This trend16 is exacerbated by increasing device capacities17 and the falling costs of digital as opposed to physical storage.18 The principles of relevance and effectiveness are of great importance for the admissibility of e-evidence.19 Indiscriminate or arbitrary search and seizure techniques risk being excessively intrusive. Since the data is not the device itself, and since much of the information on the device is not relevant to the investigation, the device itself should not be seized unless the warrant describes, with particularity, that such is what agents should search for and seize.20 Otherwise, computer hardware should only be seized if it itself is contraband, evidence, fruit or an instrumentality of crime.21 If, by contrast, the probable cause relates only to information, then the warrant should describe the information to be seized, and then request the authority to seize the information in whatever form it may be stored (electronic or otherwise).22 Agents seizing hardware should explain clearly in the supporting affidavit that they intend to search the computer for evidence and/or contraband after seizure and removal from the site of the search.23 Indeed, indiscriminately seizing devices would be the equivalent of entering an investigation scene and seizing everything without any consideration of what was being seized. By contrast, even if the warrant does not describe hardware itself, identification of a device’s IP address and separate email address linked to same physical location, for instance, may be sufficient to justify hardware seizure.24 Page 97 | Chapter 2 | § C. Procedural Issues Table of Contents

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