Case 2.9: Korean Teachers & Education Workers’ Union (2009Mo1190) (Korea)25 Korean investigators executed a warrant of search and seizure upon the headquarters of the Korean Teachers & Education Workers’ Union, removing ICT devices containing huge amounts of digital information back to their police offices, where they made copies of the files for subsequent search and analysis. The Court held that the action was allowed, as the quantity of data—over 8,000 files—to exceptional circumstances justifying such removal, even though there was no explicit ground under the warrant for doing so, and as investigators made an effort to “to limit the scope of their investigation to those parts bearing relevance to the charged crimes by copying only those files which had been accessed after a retroactively determined point of time”, with the parties implicitly agreeing on the appropriateness of such measures.26 The Court held that, “[i]n principle, a warrant of search and seizure for digital information must be executed by collecting only parts related to the suspected facts for which the warrant has been issued[….] In cases where circumstances on the site where the warrant is to be executed make it impossible or remarkably difficult to carry out the warrant in this manner, exceptions can be made to allow the storage media itself to be carried offsite […] when the warrant expressly grants for search and seizure to be performed in this manner and when such circumstances exist.”27 The Court continued that the subsequent searching and analyzing of digital information must be “must also be seen as a part of executing the warrant”.28 Moreover, where investigators seize ICT devices containing private information extending beyond information pertaining to the suspected facts, the parties “are continuously guaranteed the right of participation in the process” and not only must “no viewing or copying of the storage media is performed without [their] involvement”, but investigators must assure that “proper measures are taken to prevent files or documents from arbitrary copying or from distortion, misuse or abuse of the digital information”.29 In effect, the ballooning of an individual’s digital footprints may mean that the data—not the devices—should be screened and searched. While there may be certain circumstances where the device itself may be seized—for instance, in order to restore deleted data, to recover encrypted data, or to conduct detailed analyses—, in principle, the relevant data should be extracted from the storage device, and the device itself left on site. Many field tools are currently available to assist on-site data extraction.30 As discussed further on, tools alone are insufficient: on-site data extraction requires sophisticated technical competency and training. Without such capacity, first responders may find themselves faced with the impossible decision of either seizing the suspect hardware and risking exceeding the scope of the search warrant, therein both infringing fundamental rights and risking “tainting” the seized evidence, or leaving the hardware and risking letting evidence Page 98 | Chapter 2 | § C. Procedural Issues Table of Contents

Select target paragraph3

Connect to a paragraph
Connect to an entity
Disable highlights
Add to table of contents