be-sent data has been encrypted or after the received data and been unencrypted, rather than intercepting the data and then having to unencrypt it.40 As with many other cybercrimes, data diddling allows cybercriminals to manipulate output while largely preserving the perpetrator’s anonymity; however, data diddling is often very subtle and virtually undetectable. Forging or counterfeiting documents are typical examples. Cyber forensic tools can be used to trace when data was altered, what that data was and then to change it back to its original form. A simpler and more direct method of control is through version control and by keeping multiple records, including hardcopies, just as much for comparison’s sake as to back up the data. Data diddling may be used to target a wide-range of information; indeed, concern over possible tampering with public legal documents has limited governmental recourse to the web in areas as diverse as the publication of court judgments41 and voting.42 Case 2.3: People of Colorado v. Raymond D. Ressin et al. (USA)43 In a matter going back to 1978, Defendants defrauded a brokerage firm of US$171,756.17, and were convicted on three counts of theft. Raymond Ressin, a clerk working for a brokerage firm in Denver, Colorado, purchased two hundred shares of Loren Industries at US$1.50 for his outside accomplice, Robert Millar, amounting to a total of US$300. He subsequently altered the account number suffix, changing the purchase from a legitimate “cash” account, which was to have been paid in full, to a “margin” account, which qualified the purchase for a loan of up to fifty percent of the account value. Ressin subsequently changed the last two digits of the authorization code from LII (Loren Industries, Inc.) to LILN (Longing Island Lighting), an approved margin stock worth US$130 a share. As a result, the account value went from US$300 to US$26,000, which, as a margin account, also came, with a borrowing power of US$13,000. Ressin subsequently adjusted the records inputted into a computerized accounting system. Repeating the process, and then leveraging that fraudulent borrowing power, Defendants made further purchases, parlaying the initial US$300 investment to a net value of US$171,756.17 (approximately US$700,000 in 2016). IV. System Interference As already discussed,44 a fundamental interest is the “integrity” of private and public ICT systems and networks, meaning that they function according to their operating rules and the input furnished by the owners.45 As any unauthorized interference can seriously undermine public trust in the secure, proper functioning of ICT systems, many legal systems have adopted criminal sanctions to punish it.46 This kind of activity goes beyond undermining uncertainty in cyberspace and in the Page 83 | Chapter 2 | § B. Criminalized Conduct Table of Contents

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