A/76/136 The principle of sovereignty encompasses cyber infrastructure located in a State’s territory irrespective of whether it is governmental or private. Similarly, a cyber operation that interferes with or usurps the inherently governmental functions of another State may constitute a violation of sovereignty. 179 This is based on the premise that a State enjoys the exclusive right to exercise within its territory, ‘to the exclusion of any other State, the functions of a State’. 180 Accordingly, what matters is not whether physical damage, injury, or loss of functionality has resulted, but whether the cyber operation has interfered with data or services that are necessary for the exercise of inherently governmental functions. Cases in point would include altering or deleting data or blocking digital communication between public bodies and citizens so as to interfere with the delivery of social services, the conduct of elections, the collection of taxes, or the performance of key national defence activities. Another example could be the manipulation of police communications so that patrol cars are unable to communicate with police dispatch/operation centres. In this context it is irrelevant whether the inherently governmental function is performed by central, regional or local governments and authorities, or by non-governmental bodies in the exercise of powers delegated by such governments or authorities. Conducting elections is a clear example of an inherently governmental function. In contrast to the case of a cyber operation in breach of the prohibition of intervention, there is no requirement for the interference to reach to the level of coercion. The precise threshold of what constitute a cyber operation in violation of sovereignty is not settled in international law, and will depend on a case-by-case assessment. 3.2 The prohibition of intervention Key message: Cyber operations that compel the target State to take a course of action, whether by act or omission, in a way that it would not otherwise voluntarily have pursued (coercion) in matters relating to its internal or external affairs (domaine réservé), will constitute an intervention in violation of international law. The prohibition of intervention applies to a State’s cyber operations as it does to other State activities. 181 Accordingly, a State must not carry out cyber operations in breach of the prohibition of intervention, according to customary international law. 182 A cyber operation must therefore not be carried out to compel the target State to take a course of action, whether by act or omission, in a way that it would not otherwise voluntarily have pursued (coercion) in matters relating to its internal or external affairs (domaine réservé) – such as a State’s political, economic, social or __________________ 179 180 181 182 68/142 See Tallinn Manual 2.0, commentary to Rule 4, p. 21-22, paras. 15–16. Island of Palmas arbitral award, p. 838. Norway recognises that no State seems to object to the application of the prohibition on intervention (or rule of non-intervention) in the cyber context. Reference is made to the GGE 2015 report, para. 26 and 28(b), subsequently endorsed by the GA. However, Norway is aware that there are differences of opinion as to where the threshold for breach lies. Nicaragua judgment, para. 202. 21-09670

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