A reader that programmes the access cards for particular employees and their permitted access to parts of the site, building to secure areas. A transceiver at each control point to communicate with cards. A controller to control the locks of access points (doors). The backend system that hosts all permissions and authorised data and interfaces with the reader, transceiver and controllers. 11.7.7. Traditionally access control systems were hosted by stand-alone equipment. Modern access control system may be hosted on standard computer equipment and hosted in the organisation’s datacentre. It is possible that a system intrusion can target access control systems, making the switches, gates and locks remotely accessible. 11.7.8. Low frequency RFID badge systems use 125KHz, (ISO 11784/5 and ISO 14223). Newer high frequency RFID cards use 13.56MHz (ISO 15693, ISO 14443 and ISO 18000-3). 11.7.9. Some cards also operate at UHF frequencies of 850-960Mhz (ISO 18000-6). Some cards are designed to operate at low and high frequencies by embedding multiple antennae in the cards. 11.7.10. The ISO/IEC 14443 standard for contactless smart card communications defines two types of contactless cards ("A" and "B") and allows for communications at distances up to 10 cm operating at 13.56 MHz. 11.7.11. The alternative ISO/IEC 15693 standard allows communications at distances up to 50 cm. The ISO/IEC 7816 standard (in 15 parts) defines the physical, electrical interface and operating characteristics of these cards. 11.7.12. UHF cards follow the EPC Global Gen2 standard and the ISO 18000-6 standards and are designed to operate at distances of up to 10 metres. Smart Cards 11.7.13. Smart cards typically incorporate an embedded integrated circuit typically incorporating a microchip with internal memory, a read-only CSN (Card Serial Number) or a UID (User Identification). The card connects to a reader with direct physical contact or a contactless radio frequency (RFID) interface. With an embedded microchip, smart cards can store large amounts of data, carry out on-card functions (such as encryption and authentication) and interact intelligently with a smart card reader. Smart card technology can be found in a variety of form factors, including plastic cards, key fobs, watches, subscriber identification modules used in mobile phones, and USB-based tokens. Smart cards are widely used in payment card (debit and credit cards and electronic wallets) and access control systems. 11.7.14. In common with other RFID devices, smart cards incorporate an antenna embedded in the body of the card (or key fob, watch or token). When the card is brought within range of the reader, the chip in the card is powered on. Once powered on, an RF communication protocol is initiated and communication established between the card and the reader for data transfer. 11.7.15. Smart cards typically incorporate protective mechanisms including authentication, secure data storage, encryption, tamper-resistance and secure communication. Support for biometric authentication may also be incorporated. Near Field Communication (NFC) 11.7.16. NFC is an RFID technology that enables two electronic devices to establish communication by bringing them within 4 cm of each other. As with other "proximity" technologies, NFC employs electromagnetic induction between two loop antennae when NFC devices exchange information. NFC operates in the globally available unlicensed radio frequency band of 13.56 MHz conforming to the ISO/IEC 18000-3 standard. In access control applications these devices are sometimes known as “prox cards”. Attacks 11.7.17. In addition to attacks on RFID components described in the previous section, access control cards can be susceptible to relay and chip hacking attacks. 11.7.18. Relay attacks rely on rogue readers to activate the tag even when not in proximity to a legitimate reader. The card holder will be unaware that such an attack is underway. An effective defence is to incorporate distance-to-reader verification although few RFID systems incorporate this mechanism. 11.7.19. Signals between cards and a legitimate reader can be intercepted at distances of up to a metre. Greater distances are possible with higher powered equipment, special antennae and in low interference environments. The signals and data, including card credentials, are captured off-line and used to clone access cards. Again the card holder will be unaware that such an attack is underway. 11.7.20. Chip hacking is facilitated by physical access to the card but can be mitigated by second factor authentication, encryption of data on the card and card tamper detection. 11.7.21. Threats, vulnerabilities and mitigations of RFID access control systems are summarised in the table below: Threat/Vulnerability Interception of the RFID signals Mitigation Encryption of RF links Harden RFID elements Implants Physical security CCTV Tamper resistant readers Cryptographic attacks Use of approved cryptographic algorithms and protocols Strong key management Incident detection and management Use of evaluated products Replay Authentications Robust Random Number Generation on readers Key extraction reader attacks through side channel analysis or fault Use of evaluated products with SAM chips injection Incident detection and management 146 Version_3.5__January-2022

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