Because of the risks that data can be recovered from monitors, it is essential that any redeployment or disposal of monitors MUST follow the
guidance in the NZISM.
12.7. Supply Chain
Objective
12.7.1. Technology supply chains are established and managed to ensure continuity of supply and protection of sensitive related information.
Context
12.7.2. A supply chain is the movement of materials as they move from their source (raw materials) through manufacture to the end customer. A supply chain
can include materials acquisition, purchasing, design, manufacturing, warehousing, transportation, customer service, and supply chain management. It
requires people, information and resources to move a product from manufacturer to supplier to customer. Every supply chain carries some risk which
may include product protection; counterfeit products and goods and defective products. ICT supply chains are invariably global and complex.
12.7.3. Relationships with external service providers are established in a variety of ways, for example, through joint ventures, business partnerships,
outsourcing arrangements (e.g. through supply contracts, interagency agreements, lines of business arrangements, service-level agreements),
licensing agreements, and/or supply chain exchanges. The growing use of external service providers and new relationships being established with
those providers present new and difficult challenges for organisations, especially in the area of information system security. These challenges include:
Defining the types of external information system services provided to organisations;
Describing how those external services are protected; and
Obtaining the necessary assurances that the risks to organisational operations and assets, individuals, other organisations, and national security
arising from the use of the external services are acceptable.
12.7.4. The degree of confidence that the risk from using external services is at an acceptable level depends on the assurance external organisations provide
and trust that organisations place in external service providers. In some cases, the level of trust is based on the amount of direct control organisations
are able to exert on external service providers in the use of security controls and assurance on the effectiveness of those controls.
12.7.5. The level of control is usually established by the terms and conditions of the contracts or service-level agreements with the external service providers
and can range from extensive control (e.g., negotiating contracts or agreements that specify detailed security requirements for the providers) to very
limited control (e.g., using contracts or service-level agreements to obtain commodity services such as commercial telecommunications services).
12.7.6. From an Information Assurance viewpoint, there are five key aspects to supply chain risk:
1. Protection of sensitive information and systems;
2. Continuity of supply;
3. Product assurance;
4. Security validation; and
5. National Procurement Policy
Protection of sensitive information and systems
12.7.7. This relates to the security of the supply chain, products and information relating to the intended use, purchaser, location and type of equipment.
Continuity of supply
12.7.8. This is the traditional set of risks associated with supply chain. As supply chains have globalised and components are sourced from a number of
countries, a disruption to supply may have a global effect.
Product assurance
12.7.9. This relates to assurance that the product, technology or device performs as designed and specified and includes the provenance of the product,
equipment, or device.
Security validation
12.7.10. Security validation checks the performance and security of the equipment. The security design elements and features of the equipment or product will
need to be separately considered from any operational drivers.
National procurement policy
12.7.11. All agencies are required to follow the guidance of the Government Rules of Procurement. Some exemptions are permitted under Rule 13 including that
of security, “essential security interests: Measures necessary for the protection of essential security interests, procurement indispensable for national
security or for national defence…”. Care must be taken to follow these rules wherever possible.
Scope
12.7.12. This manual provides additional guidance for managing supply chain security risks associated with the acquisition (lease or purchase) of ICT equipment
or services for use in NZ Government systems.
References
12.7.13. While NOT an exhaustive list, further information on procurement and supply chain can be found at:
Reference
163
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Version_3.5__January-2022
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