17.1.36. The New Zealand National Standard for High Assurance Cryptographic Equipment (HACE) and related key management is contained in theNew Zealand Communications Security Policy No. 301 – Safeguarding of Communications Security (COMSEC) Material. This prescribes national doctrine for the safeguarding of COMSEC materials. New Zealand Communications Security Policy No. 301 – Safeguarding of Communications Security (COMSEC) Material, replaces New Zealand Communications Security Standard No. 300 – Control of COMSEC Material which is now withdrawn. Note NZCSP 301 is a RESTRICTED document. Protection of RESTRICTED/SENSITIVE information in transit over public systems 17.1.37. The physical requirements for protection of information classified RESTRICTED/SENSITIVE are provided by the classification system and PSR guidance. 17.1.38. Where such information is generated and held on information systems (any computer device, including laptops, mobile phones, tablets, desktop and networked systems), the requirements of the NZISM apply. Of particular note is the requirement to encrypt RESTRICTED/SENSITIVE data when in transit over public systems, including any Internet connection, public network or any other network NOT directly controlled by the agency. Encryption and Key Management 17.1.39. Direct agency control is described as the immediate and continuous physical and logical control, responsibility for, protection and operation of agency information systems and data (see 2.2.4). 17.1.40. Indirect agency control is described as when information is not under the direct control of the agency, this may be through outsourcing, ICT management or services, third party facilities such as data centre co-locations, or consumption of cloud services (see 2.2.5 – 2.2.7). 17.1.41. Encryption can be used to protect information not under the direct control of the agency. 17.1.42. The use of encryption (including data encryption, use of a VPN or any other form of protection using cryptography) requires cryptographic key management and the retention of control of both keys and key management processes. 17.1.43. Where agencies make use of VPNs or other forms of network connectivity that protect data in transit, the control and management of the cryptographic key is fundamental to the integrity and confidentiality of the encrypted data. 17.1.44. If encryption keys are compromised, then any authentication and encryption mechanisms that rely on those keys, no matter how robust or comprehensive, are futile. 17.1.45. If encryption keys are lost, damaged, or fail then access to data encrypted using those keys will also be lost. If control of encryption keys is lost, then those keys should be considered to be compromised and must be replaced or superceded urgently. 17.1.46. The selection of the cryptographic protocol and algorithm is described in this chapter and specified in 17.1.55.C.02. It is essential that agencies select and use only approved cryptographic algorithms and protocols (see section 17.2 – Approved Cryptographic Protocols) and apply the cryptographic key management requirements of the NZISM (see section 17.9 - Key Management). VPN connection Security 17.1.47. The types of encryption, protocols, and cryptographic algorithms applied in the establishment and maintenance of a VPN connection are fundamental to the security and integrity of the connection. 17.1.48. Key aspects of VPN security include: The encryption algorithm and protocol used; Cryptographic key length; The authentication protocol Key Exchange protocol; Selection of VPN protocol; VPN monitoring and a “kill switch” to deter IP leakage and snooping; Cryptographic key management. 17.1.49. It is important to understand that a variety of VPN services can use a variety of mechanisms. Agencies should also consider the service provider’s use of hash authentication, perfect forward secrecy, and the difference in encryption settings on both the data and control channels. The NZISM specifies the cryptographic protocols and cryptographic algorithms that should be used (see sections 17.2 – Approved Cryptographic Algorithms and 17.3 – Approved Cryptographic Protocols) and agencies must ensure the VPN connection conforms with these requirements. References 17.1.50. Further references can be found at: Reference NZCSP 301 Title New Zealand Communications Publisher GCSB Source Contact the GCSB Security Policy 301 - Safeguarding of RESTRICTED document avaliable on Communications Security (COMSEC) application to authorised personnel Material, NZCSP 301 replaces NZCSS 300 NZCSS 500 New Zealand Communications GCSB Security Standard No. 500 - Policy Contact the GCSB RESTRICTED document avaliable on application to authorised personnel PSR Handling requirements for protectively marked information and equipment NZ Government Protective Security Requirements https://protectivesecurity.govt.nz/inf ormation-security/classificationsystem-and-handlingrequirements/handlingrequirements/ 233 Version_3.5__January-2022

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