collision attacks have been published for SHA-1, they may become feasible in the near future.
17.2.26.R.02. Rationale
SHA-1 has been deprecated and the use of SHA-1 is permitted ONLY for legacy systems to validate existing hashes previously generated using
SHA-1.
17.2.26.C.01. ControlSystem Classification(s): All Classifications; Compliance: MUST
[CID:2155]
Agencies MUST use the SHA-2 family for new systems. Use of SHA-1 is permitted ONLY for legacy systems.
17.2.26.C.02. ControlSystem Classification(s): All Classifications; Compliance: MUST
[CID:5905]
Agencies MUST use a minimum of SHA-384 when using hashing algorithms to provide integrity protection for information classified as
RESTRICTED/SENSITIVE or above.
17.2.26.C.03. ControlSystem Classification(s): All Classifications; Compliance: MUST
[CID:7187]
In all other cases when information requires integrity protection using hashing algorithms, Agencies MUST use a minimum of SHA-256.
17.2.27. Salts
17.2.27.R.01. Rationale
The use of salts strengthens the resistance of hash values to a variety of attacks, including brute-force, rainbow table, dictionary and lookup
table attacks.
17.2.27.R.02. Rationale
Key derivation functions use a password, a salt, then generate a password hash. Their purpose is to make password guessing by an attacker
who has obtained a password hash file expensive and therefore the cost of a guessing attack high and prohibitive.
17.2.27.C.01. ControlSystem Classification(s): All Classifications; Compliance: MUST
[CID:6560]
Memorised secrets such as passwords MUST be stored in a form that is resistant to offline attacks.
17.2.27.C.02. ControlSystem Classification(s): All Classifications; Compliance: SHOULD
[CID:6561]
Memorised secrets such as passwords SHOULD be salted and hashed using a suitable one-way key derivation function. See17.2.24.
17.2.27.C.03. ControlSystem Classification(s): All Classifications; Compliance: SHOULD
[CID:6562]
The salt SHOULD be at least 32 bits in length, be chosen arbitrarily, and each instance is unique so as to minimise salt value collisions among
stored hashes.
17.2.28. Approved symmetric encryption algorithms
17.2.28.R.01. Rationale
The use of Electronic Code Book (ECB) mode in block ciphers allows repeated patterns in plaintext to appear as repeated patterns in the
ciphertext. Most cleartext, including written language and formatted files, contains significant repeated patterns. An attacker can use this to
deduce possible meanings of ciphertext by comparison with previously intercepted data. In other cases they might be able to determine
information about the key by inferring certain contents of the cleartext. The use of other modes such as Cipher Block Chaining, Cipher
Feedback, Output Feedback or Counter prevents such attacks.
17.2.28.C.01. ControlSystem Classification(s): All Classifications; Compliance: SHOULD NOT
[CID:2158]
Agencies using approved symmetric encryption algorithms (e.g. AES) SHOULD NOT use Electronic Code Book (ECB) mode.
17.3. Approved Cryptographic Protocols
Objective
17.3.1. Classified information in transit is protected by an Approved Cryptographic Protocol implementing an Approved Cryptographic Algorithm.
Context
Scope
17.3.2. This section covers information on the cryptographic protocols that the GCSB recognises as being approved for use within government.
Implementations of the protocols in this section need to have successfully completed a GCSB recognised cryptographic evaluation before they can be
approved for implementation.
17.3.3. High assurance cryptographic protocols are not covered in this section.
Approved cryptographic protocols
17.3.4. In general, the GCSB only recognises the use of cryptographic products that have passed a formal evaluation. However, the GCSB may approve the
use of some commonly available cryptographic protocols even though their implementations within specific products have not been formally
evaluated. This approval is limited to cases where they are used in accordance with the requirements in this manual.
17.3.5. The Approved Cryptographic Protocols are:
TLS;
SSH;
S/MIME;
OpenPGP Message Format; and
IPSec.
Rationale & Controls
242
Version_3.5__January-2022
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