tag can have legitimate data replaced by a malicious command.
Tag Cloning: Clones replicate the functionality of legitimate tags and can be used to access controlled areas, abuse private data, or make an
unauthorised electronic transaction. Tag authentication using a challenge-response protocol is a defence against cloning as the information that
attackers can obtain through the air interface (such as by eavesdropping) is insufficient to provide a legitimate response. The design of the tag
can also incorporate measures at the circuit manufacturing stage to protect tags from duplication by reverse engineering.
Data corruption: Most RFID tags are rewritable by design. This feature may be locked (turning the tag into a write-once, read-many device) or
left active, depending on application and security sensitivity. For example, in libraries, the RFID tags are frequently left unlocked for the
convenience of librarians in reusing the tags on different books or to track check-ins and check-outs. If tags are not protected, it creates an
opportunity for malicious users to overwrite data, typically in the theft of high-value goods by marking them as low-value items or in the case of
weapons monitoring, changing the weapon identification.
Shipment or People tracking : While RFID tags are designed to assist in stock control and supply chain management, unauthorised tracking of
shipments or of people is undesirable and may even be dangerous. It is possible to follow individuals carrying tags using several techniques,
including placing fake readers at building access points, deploying unauthorised readers near legitimate readers and creating relay points along
expected routes.
Tag Blocking: This is a form of denial of service by introducing a blocker tag which is designed to simulate all possible tags in an allocated
range. This causes readers to continually perform multiple reads on non-existent and non-responsive tags. Blocker tags are sometimes used
where privacy or confidentiality are required.
Denial of Service (DOS): Also known as flooding attacks where a signal is flooded with more data than it is designed to handle. Similar in many
respects to RF Jamming.
Attack Vectors
11.6.20. Attack vectors for RFID devices include:
interception of legitimate transmissions (man-in-the-middle [MITM] attacks);
interception of authorised reader data by an unauthorised device;
unauthorised access to tags and readers;
rogue/cloned tags;
rogue and unauthorised RFID readers;
side-channel attacks (timing measurements, electromagnetic radiations etc.);
attacks on back-end systems;
jamming of legitimate signals.
11.6.21. Because RFID devices incorporate antennas, there is a possibility of radiation hazards from high –powered devices, particularly active tags and readers.
It is important to note however that these cases are rare, occur in high powered devices only and that the vast majority of RFID devices do not pose
radiation hazards. Related hazards include electromagnetic radiation hazards to personnel (HERP), fuel (HERF) and ordnance (HERO).
11.6.22. Threats and Vulnerabilities of RFID systems are summarised in the table below:
Threat/Vulnerability
Tag
RF
Reader
Network
Back-End
People
Eavesdropping
Relay Attack
Unauthorised Tag
Reading
(skimming)
People Tracking
Shipment
Tracking
Tag Cloning
Replay Attack
Insert Attack
Tag Content
Modification
Malware
RFID System
Failure
Tag Destruction
Tag Blocking
Denial of Service
(DoS)
133
Version_3.5__January-2022
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