Metal and reflective objects that can modify and amplify signals in unintended and potentially harmful ways, and
Legitimate radio and Wi-Fi systems to avoid interference.
11.6.64.R.02. Rationale
Tag location cannot always be controlled, such as when tags are used to track mobile items or goods in transit. Other difficulties occur with
persistent radio interference. In these situations, relocation of readers and tags may provide a solution. Consideration should be given to
alternative but cost-effective RF protection measures, such as grounded wire fencing. The engineering assessment undertaken to determine
the shielding requirements will assist in determining such measures.
11.6.64.C.01. ControlSystem Classification(s): All Classifications; Compliance: SHOULD
[CID:2983]
Agencies SHOULD consider placement of tags and location of readers to avoid unnecessary electromagnetic radiation.
11.6.65. Encoding and Encryption
11.6.65.R.01. Rationale
If an adversary reads an identifier that is encoded with a published format, such as in the EPC standard, an adversary may be able to obtain
useful information such as the manufacturer or issuer of the item, as well as the type of item. Because RFID tags hold limited information and
identifier formats are published in standards, it may be important to use identifier formats that do not reveal any information about tagged
items or the agency using the RFID system. This will be determined in the risk assessment. Encoding schemes to limit information revealed
from unauthorised scanning may include serially or randomly assigning identifiers.
11.6.65.R.02. Rationale
Adversaries can often obtain valuable information from the identifier alone. For example, knowledge of the EPC manager ID and object class
bits may reveal the make and model of tagged objects in a container. If individual items or boxes of items are tagged, the quantities may also
be discernible. An adversary might target containers based on their contents.
11.6.65.R.03. Rationale
The smallest tags generally used for consumer items, such as clothing, do not have enough computing power to support data encryption. At
best these tags can cater for PIN-style or password-based protection. Data can, however, be encrypted before it is stored on a tag. In these
designs, encryption is undertaken by the RFID subsystem or the RFID reader. This is an effective means of protecting the data on a tag. Refer
also to Chapter 17 – Cryptography.
11.6.65.R.04. Rationale
The current Gen 2 standard provides for an on-chip 16-bit Pseudo-Random Number Generator (RNG) and a 16-bit Cyclic Redundancy Code
(CRC-16) to protect tag/reader channels. Neither of these encryption methods is strong because of the short bit length in the RNG and because
CRCs are not suitable for protection against malicious alteration of data.
11.6.65.C.01. ControlSystem Classification(s): All Classifications; Compliance: MUST
[CID:2989]
Agencies MUST follow the requirements of the NZISM in the selection and implementation of cryptographic protocols and algorithms, and in key
management, detailed in Chapter 17 - Cryptography.
11.6.65.C.02. ControlSystem Classification(s): All Classifications; Compliance: SHOULD
[CID:2990]
Agencies SHOULD encrypt data before it is written to RFID tags.
11.6.65.C.03. ControlSystem Classification(s): All Classifications; Compliance: SHOULD
[CID:2991]
Agencies SHOULD assign RFID identifiers using formats that limit information about tagged items or about the agency operating the RFID
system.
11.6.66. Authentication
11.6.66.R.01. Rationale
Both an RFID reader and RFID tag share a common secret key that can be used in combination with a hash algorithm to provide one-way or
mutual authentication between tag and reader. This is known as a Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC). When HMAC is
applied to messages, it also assures the integrity of data in the messages. HMAC is not specified in any RFID standard, but the capability is
generally available in vendor products. HMAC is often used where the risk of eavesdropping is high and passwords alone are considered to offer
an inadequate authentication mechanism. This will be determined by the risk assessment. HMAC is also used where applications require
evidence of a tag’s authenticity.
11.6.66.C.01. ControlSystem Classification(s): All Classifications; Compliance: SHOULD
[CID:2994]
Agencies SHOULD consider the use of HMAC when tag authenticity is required.
11.6.67. Password Management
11.6.67.R.01. Rationale
RFID tags generally require passwords before execution of commands such as reading and writing of tag data, memory access control, and the
tag kill feature. Passwords are an important control in maintaining the security and integrity of the RFID system. Refer also to Chapter 16 –
Access Control.
11.6.67.R.02. Rationale
Tags should not share passwords, although this may not be practical in all cases. In applications such as supply chains, multiple organisations
may require access to databases that contain tag identifiers and passwords. In such cases external entities must be authenticated and incident
management, audit logging and other security controls are essential. While in traditional IT systems, passwords are often changed on a periodic
basis, in RFID systems, such changes may be impractical, especially if the tags are not always accessible to the agency assigning the
passwords.
11.6.67.C.01. ControlSystem Classification(s): All Classifications; Compliance: MUST
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[CID:2998]
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