RF Jamming
Back-End Attacks
Radiation
Hazard
11.6.23. It is important to note that attacks are often used in combination creating blended attacks. Blended attacks may be a combination of attack types, use
of multiple attack vectors, the targeting of individual sub-systems or combinations of all three elements.
Good Practices and Countermeasures
11.6.24. Good practice for ensuring the security and privacy of RFID systems includes:
a risk assessment to determine the nature and extent of risk and threat in the proposed use of RFID;
strong security architecture to protect RFID databases and communication systems;
authentication of approved users of RFID systems;
encryption of radio signals when feasible;
temporarily or permanently disabling tags when not required;
shielding RFID tags and tag reading areas to prevent unauthorised access or modification;
incident management, audit procedures, logging and time stamping to help detect and manage security breaches; and
tag disposal and recycling procedures that permanently disable or destroy sensitive data.
Authentication
11.6.25. By design and usage, RFID technologies are item, product or shipment identificationbut not authentication technologies. Authentication of a reader or
tag requires a common secret (key) shared when establishing communication, and before data is exchanged. Currently, only RFID tags with
microprocessors have sufficient computation resources to use authentication techniques. These can be found in such applications as e-passports, or
payment or ticketing applications (public transport, for example).
11.6.26. With a challenge/response authentication mechanism the reader issues an enquiry to the tag which results in a response. The secret tag information is
computed information from internal cryptographic algorithms by both the tag and reader and the results are sent. Correct responses are required for a
successful information exchange. The system is essentially the same as encrypting data over a standard radio link.
11.6.27. The ISO/JTC1/SC31 committee is in the process of establishing new standards to support the use of simple RFID authentication and encryption
protocols.
Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC)
11.6.28. HMAC is a protocol where both an RFID reader and RFID tag share a common secret key that can be used in combination with a hash algorithm to
provide one-way or mutual authentication between tag and reader. When HMAC is applied to messages, it also assures the integrity of data in the
messages.
11.6.29. HMAC is not specified in any RFID standard, but the capability is generally available in vendor products. HMAC is often used where the risk of
eavesdropping is high and passwords alone are considered to offer an inadequate authentication mechanism. This will be determined by the risk
assessment. HMAC is also used where applications require evidence of a tag’s authenticity.
Digital Signatures
11.6.30. Digital signatures are compatible with existing RFID tag standards. In authenticated RFID systems, tags can receive, store, and transmit digital
signatures with existing read and write commands because the complexity is managed by readers or back-end systems. However, the use of digital
signatures to support authentication of readers to tags would require tags to support relatively complex cryptographic functions, beyond the capacity
of common tag designs.
11.6.31. In addition, digital signatures that are not generated by the tag itself are subject to replay attacks. An adversary could query a tag to obtain its
evidence of authenticity (i.e., the digital signature created by a previous reader) and then replicate that data on a cloned tag. Consequently, password
or symmetric key authentication systems likely will support tag access control, as opposed to tag authenticity verification, for the immediate future.
Encryption
11.6.32. Data stored in the memory of an RFID tag is intended to be freely shared with the various tag users (manufacturers, stock controllers, shipping agents,
etc.). Only an RFID reader is required to access the data which raises the question of data security. Memory and computational power of an RFID tag is
limited, but data elements can be password-protected or reserved for nominated usage. Several levels of authorisation (read-only, read and write,
delete, etc.) can be determined. It is also advisable to encrypt the data entered onto the tag, the encryption/decryption taking place at the RFID reader
or back-end system.
Cover-Coding
11.6.33. Cover-coding is a method of hiding information from eavesdroppers. In the EPCglobal Class-1 Generation-2 standard, cover-coding is used to obscure
passwords and information written to a tag using the write command. Some proprietary technologies also support similar features. Cover-coding is an
example of minimalist cryptography because it operates within the challenging power and memory constraints of passive RFID tags.
11.6.34. Cover-coding is a useful mitigation where eavesdropping is a risk, but adversaries are expected to be at a greater distance from the tags than readers.
Cover-coding helps prevent the execution of unauthorised commands that could disable a tag or modify the tag’s data. Cover-coding mitigates
business process, business intelligence, and privacy risks.
Rolling Code
11.6.35. A rolling code approach is a scheme where the identifier given by the RFID tag changes after each read action. It requires the RFID reader and RFID tag
to use identical algorithms. If multiple readers are used, they must be linked so that tracking of code changes can be monitored. This scheme reduces
the usefulness of any responses that may be observed unless the pattern of change can be detected or deduced.
Other Defensive Measures
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