forces, facilitates safe trade for our industry and protects high-skilled jobs across
the UK. Our successes in the past five years – including the response to Russia’s
Salisbury attack and the attribution of chemical weapons use in Syria – have
contributed to our global reputation as a force for good and an S&T power.
27. To protect these gains, we must: address growing threats from states such as Iran,
Russia and North Korea; respond to emerging threats such as the illicit acquisition of
advanced and dual-use technologies; and reinforce the global counter-proliferation
architecture against growing pressures, shaping its future in our interest. Our priority
actions will be:
• To reinforce international governance of state access to CBRN weapons,
materials or related technology through our work with the relevant treaty
bodies – especially the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and
International Atomic Energy Agency, whose nuclear safeguards system we will
strengthen. In particular, we will do more to expose non-compliance with governing
treaties (see nuclear deterrent section). Alongside our allies, the UK will hold Iran to
account for its nuclear activity, remaining open to talks on a more comprehensive
nuclear and regional deal. We will also remain the most engaged non-regional
partner on North Korea’s denuclearisation and on sanctions enforcement.
• To reduce tensions in South Asia, by encouraging regional dialogue on nuclear
responsibilities, and by working with states there to understand and respond to
safety and security threats to the region.
• To counter proliferation to states. Using intelligence analysis, we will increase
our knowledge of those who seek access to CBRN and advanced military and
dual-use technology. We will tackle proliferation networks and proliferation finance
by identifying hot spots, routes and mechanisms for their transfer. Improvements
to the Academic Technology Approval Scheme will help to stop states from using
research relationships with UK academia to steal intellectual property and obtain
knowledge that could be used to develop CBRN weapons and their means of
delivery, or advanced military technology.
• To counter proliferation to non-state actors, strengthening the security and
safety of nuclear materials in priority countries. We will also reduce the risk of
terrorist acquisition of biological agents through our International Biological Security
Programme and the G7 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and
Materials of Mass Destruction.
• To balance the opportunities of new technologies with controls, sustaining
our own legitimate investment and supporting other responsible states’ use of new
technologies through technical cooperation. Working with experts, industry and
allies, the UK will maintain an efficient export control system on weapons and dualuse technology that adapts with technological change. We will also recommend
changes to counter-proliferation regimes and international governance that take
account of new routes to CBRN and advanced weapons enabled by technology.
IV. Strategic Framework
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