The speed at which malicious code can spread through a system presents significant challenges and an important part of any defensive strategy is to contain the attack and limit damage. If the firewall is configured to block all traffic on a particular range of port numbers, then the IDS should inspect traffic for these port numbers and alert if they are detected. Generating alerts for any information flows that contravene any rule within the firewall rule set will assist security personnel in identifying and reporting to any possible breaches of agency systems. In order to reduce the attack surface area of agency systems, it is good practice that agencies disable unused services and functions within network devices and operating systems. If agencies are deploying dual‐stack equipment but not using the IPv6 functionality, then that functionality should be disabled. It can be re‐enabled when required. This will reduce the opportunity to exploit IPv6 functionality before appropriate security measures have been implemented. The information security implications around the use of IPv6 are still largely unknown and un‐ tested. As many of the deployed network protection technologies, such as firewalls and IDSs, do not consistently support IPv6, agencies choosing to implement IPv6 face an increased risk of systems compromise. A number of tunneling protocols have been developed to facilitate interoperability between IPv4 and IPv6. Disabling IPv6 tunneling protocols when this functionality is not explicitly required will reduce the risk of bypassing network defenses by means of encapsulating IPv6 data inside IPv4 packets. Stateless Address Auto configuration (SLAAC) is a method of stateless IP address configuration in IPv6. SLAAC reduces the ability to maintain complete logs of IP address assignment on the network. To avoid this constraint, stateless IP addressing shouldnot be used. Introducing IPv6 capable network devices into agency gateways can introduce a significant number of new security risks. Undergoing reaccreditation when new IPv6 equipment is introduced will ensure that any IPv6 functionality that is not intended to be used cannot be exploited by an attacker before appropriate information security mechanisms have been put in place. Once agencies have completed the transition to a dual‐stack environment or completely to an IPv6 environment, reaccreditation will assist in ensuring that the associated information security mechanisms for IPv6 are working Gateway Security. 21.5. Objective Gateways To ensure that gateways are properly configured to protect agency systems and information transferred between systems 109

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