A/76/136
control is high. A financial contribution to the activities of a non-state actor, for
example, is not sufficient.
In order to attribute a cyber operation it is not required that a state disclose the
underlying evidence. Evidence in the legal sense becomes relevant only if legal
proceedings are instituted. A state that takes countermeasures or relies on its inherent
right of self-defence (see below) in response to a cyber operation may eventually have
to render account for its actions, for example if the matter is brought before the
International Court of Justice. In such a situation, it must be possible to provide
evidence justifying the countermeasure or the exercise of the right of self-defence. This
can include both information obtained through regular channels and intelligence.
Under international law there is no fixed standard concerning the burden of proof
a state must meet for (legal) attribution, and thus far the International Court of Justice has
accepted different standards of proof. The CAVV and the AIV rightly observe as
follows in this regard: ‘International law does nothave hard rules on the level of proof
required but practice and case law require sufficient certainty on the origin of the
attack and the identity of the author of the attack before action can be taken.’ 163
In the government’s view, the burden of proof will indeed vary in accordance
with the situation, depending on the seriousness of the act considered to be in breach
of international law and the intended countermeasures.
States’ response options
International law provides states with various options for responding to conduct
by another state in cyberspace. The options available in a particular case depend on
the specific circumstances. Below the government sets out the main response options
available.
Retorsion
Retorsion relates to acts that, while unfriendly, are not in violation of
international law. This option is therefore always available to states that wish to
respond to undesirable conduct by another state, because it is a lawful exercise of a
state’s sovereign powers. States are free to take these kinds of measures as long they
remain within the bounds of their obligations under international law.
A state may respond to a cyber operation by another state, for example, by
declaring diplomats ‘persona non grata���, or by taking economic or other measures
against individuals or entities involvedin the operation. Another retorsion measure a
state may consider is limiting or cutting off the other state’s access to servers or other
digital infrastructure in its territory, provided the countries in question have not
concluded a treaty on mutual access to digital infrastructure in each other’s territory.
Countermeasures
If a state is the victim of a violation by another state of an obligation under
international law (i.e. an internationally wrongful act), it may under certain
164
circumstances take countermeasures in response. Countermeasures are acts (or
omissions) that would normally constitute a violation of an obligation under
international law but which are permitted because they are a response to a previous
violation by another state. In cyberspace, for example, a cyber operation could be
launched to shut down networks or systems that another state is using for a
__________________
163
164
62/142
‘Cyber Warfare’, No 77, AIV/ No. 22, CAVV December 2011, p. 22.
For a more detailed discussion of the concept of countermeasures, see the letter of 13 April 2011
from the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the House of Representatives, Parliamentary Papers,
House of Representatives, 2010/11, 32 500 V, no. 166.
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