Korean Peninsula Section 4 1 North Korea 1 General Situation 1 2 3 Chapter 3 Defense Policies of Countries In March 2013, Chairman Kim Jong-un1 adopted the “Byungjin line” policy of simultaneous economic and nuclear development. At the 7th Congress of the Korean Workers’ Party (KWP) in May 2016, he made it clear that he would uphold the “Byungjin line” as well as the “Songun politics.”2 Between 2016 and 2017, North Korea pushed ahead with three nuclear tests and as many as 40 ballistic missile launches. The international community responded by imposing sanctions under relevant UN Security Council resolutions, while Japan and the United States were among those who strengthened their own sanctions against North Korea. On the other hand, in April 2018, Chairman Kim declared that the “Byungjin line” had been successfully carried out as the development of the state nuclear force had been completed. He also announced that the “new strategic line” was that the whole of the party and the whole of the state would fully concentrate efforts on the construction of a socialist economy. In addition, North Korea decided to discontinue “nuclear test and inter-continental ballistic rocket test-fire,” announcing in May 2018 that the nuclear test ground had been blown up. During the U.S.-North Korea summit meeting that June, Chairman Kim expressed the intention to work towards denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. However, the February 2019 U.S.-North Korea summit meeting ended without the two sides reaching an agreement. In December of the same year, Chairman Kim announced the intention to continue developing strategic weapons until the United States rolled back its hostile policy towards North Korea. In addition, at the 8th Congress of the KWP in January 2021, North Korea showed its hostile stance towards the United States. At the same time, it showed its stance of continuing development of its nuclear and missile capabilities, including to “further strengthen the nuclear war deterrent while doing our best to build up the most powerful military strength.” In another speech in October of the same year, Chairman Kim stated that “our arch-enemy is the war itself” and emphasized that the possession of military capabilities constituted the “self-defensive and mandatory right” of a sovereign nation, and that strengthening military capabilities was the Party’s “priority policy.” Since February 2022, North Korea has resumed launches of intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM)-class ballistic missiles. Following the March 24 launch in particular, North Korea reiterated its intent to enhance its related technologies, announcing that it will continue to strengthen its nuclear capabilities while widely publicizing the launch of a new type of ICBM-class ballistic missile. These remarks indicate that North Korea will continue to make efforts to maintain and enhance its military capabilities and combat readiness, including its nuclear and missile capabilities. According to the official announcement at the Supreme People’s Assembly in February 2022, the proportion of the defense budget in the FY2022 budget of North Korea was 15.9%. However, it is believed that this represents only a fraction of the real defense expenditures. North Korea has continued to promote the development of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and ballistic missiles and the enhancement of its operation capabilities, including by conducting six nuclear tests in the past and repeatedly launching ballistic missiles in recent years. Technologically, North Korea is considered to have already miniaturized nuclear weapons to fit ballistic missile warheads and possess the capability to launch an attack on Japan with a ballistic missile fitted with a nuclear warhead. Furthermore, in January 2021, Chairman Kim mentioned the development of “ultra-modern tactical nuclear weapons, including intermediate-range cruise missiles.” In September of the same year and in January 2022, North Korea announced that it had succeeded in conducting test launches of long-range cruise missiles.3Moreover, North Korea is assessed to possess large-scale cyber units as part of its asymmetric military capabilities, engaging in theft of military secrets and developing capabilities to As of 2013, Kim Jong-un held the position of the First Chairman of the National Defense Commission. At the Supreme People’s Assembly in June 2016, the National Defense Commission was renamed the State Affairs Commission, and Kim Jong-un assumed the position of Chairman of the State Affairs Commission. Reflecting this change, “Chairman of the State Affairs Commission” is used for the title of Kim Jong-un throughout this white paper. In a written decision of the 7th Congress of the KWP, “Report on the Work of the KWP Central Committee” (May 8, 2016), it has been defined as a basic form of socialist politics that leads the great undertaking of socialism to victory by giving priority to the military forces in all activities under the principle of military first, and strengthening and relying on the actors in the revolution with the Korean People’s Army (KPA) acting as the central and main force. On September 13, 2021, North Korea announced that it successfully test-fired newly-developed long-range cruise missiles on September 11 and 12, and that the missiles had flown for about two hours and hit a target 1,500 km away. In addition, on January 28, 2022, North Korea announced that on January 25, 2022, it launched a long-range cruise missile, believed to be of a different type from the aforementioned missile, which hit a target 1,800 km away. DEFENSE WHITE PAPER 78

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