Part I
Security Environment Surrounding Japan
missile (SLBM).
In addition, since entering into 2022, North Korea
has resumed launches of intermediate-range ballistic
missile (IRBM)-class and longer range ballistic missiles,
which it had not done since 2018, unilaterally escalating
its provocations even as the international community
was responding to Russia’s aggression of Ukraine. After
launching an ICBM-class ballistic missile on March 24
of that year, it stated that it would strengthen its nuclear
capabilities and develop further means of attack. Such
recent remarkable development of nuclear and missilerelated technologies by North Korea cannot be overlooked
for the security of Japan and the region. This series of
actions by North Korea threatens the peace and security of
Japan, the region, and the international community. With
it still maintaining its stance of turning its back on the
international community to continue developing nuclear
and ballistic missiles, it is necessary for Japan to continue
carefully monitoring trends in what actions North Korea
takes moving forward.
Chapter
3
Defense Policies of Countries
(1) Nuclear Weapons
a. The Current Status of the Nuclear Weapons Program
Details of the current status of North Korea’s nuclear
weapons program are largely unclear because North Korea
remains an extremely closed regime. However, considering
that North Korea has already conducted six nuclear tests,
it is conceivable that North Korea has made considerable
progress in its nuclear weapons program.
With regard to plutonium, a fissile material that can be
used for nuclear weapons,8 North Korea has suggested
its production and extraction on several instances.9 As
for recent activities, in September 2015, North Korea
announced that all nuclear facilities in Yongbyon,
including the nuclear reactor and the reprocessing facility,
the disablement of which was agreed upon at the fifth and
the sixth round of the Six-Party Talks in February and
September 2007, respectively, had been readjusted and
had started normal operation. Because the restarting of
the reactor could lead to the production and extraction of
plutonium by North Korea, those activities are causes of
8
9
10
81
Object claimed to be a hydrogen bomb loaded on ICBM
[AFP=Jiji]
great concern.
As for highly enriched uranium that can also be used
for nuclear weapons, in June 2009, North Korea declared
the commencement of uranium enrichment. In November
2010, North Korea disclosed its uranium enrichment facility
to American nuclear specialists and later announced that it
was operating a uranium enrichment plant equipped with
thousands of centrifuges. The expansion of this uranium
enrichment plant has been suggested in recent years; in this
regard, North Korea could have increased its enrichment
capabilities. The series of North Korean behaviors related
to uranium enrichment indicate the possibility of the
development of nuclear weapons using highly enriched
uranium in addition to plutonium.10 In general, facilities
used for uranium enrichment are more secretive in
appearance than reactors used for plutonium production,
and it is difficult to ascertain their activities from the
outside. On the other hand, plutonium has a smaller critical
mass than uranium, and it is pointed out that it is easier to
make nuclear weapons smaller and lighter. In light of both
these advantages, North Korea may continue to promote
the development of both plutonium and uranium types of
nuclear weapons.
In regard to related nuclear activities, North Korea is
believed to be continuing to promote the improvement of its
nuclear capabilities. A report compiled by the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in August 2021 pointed
out that there were signs that some nuclear-related facilities
Plutonium is synthetically produced in a nuclear reactor by irradiating uranium with neutrons, and then extracting it from used nuclear fuel at a reprocessing facility. Plutonium is then used as a
basic material for the production of nuclear weapons. Meanwhile, in order to use uranium for nuclear weapons, it is necessary to extract uranium 235 (U235), a highly fissile material, from natural
uranium. This process is called enrichment. Generally, a large-scale enrichment facility that combines thousands of centrifuges is used to boost the U235 concentration to nuclear weapon levels
(over 90%).
North Korea announced in October 2003 that it had completed the reprocessing of 8,000 used fuel rods that contain plutonium, and in May 2005 that it had completed extraction of an additional
8,000 used fuel rods. The 2020 Defense White Paper of the ROK estimates that North Korea possesses around 50 kg of plutonium, retaining the assessment given in the 2018 Defense White
Paper.
The 2020 Defense White Paper of the ROK assesses that North Korea possesses a substantial amount of highly enriched uranium (HEU). It has been noted that a uranium enrichment facility
different from the one in Yongbyon exists in Kangson.
DEFENSE OF JAPAN 2022
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