Korean Peninsula Section 4
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The SRBM (North Korea calls “super-large multiple rocket
launcher”) launched in 2019 on August 24, September 10,
October 31, and November 28, and on March 2, 9 and
29, 2020 are all presumed to be of a different type from
the aforementioned SRBM A and B. Two missiles were
launched on each of the aforementioned dates and flew
approximately 300-400 km. Some of the intervals between
launches were estimated less than 1 minute, suggesting
that North Korea is trying to improve the continuous fire
capability required for saturation attacks and the like.
Regarding TELs, various types can be confirmed in images
published by North Korea.
Details are still being analyzed for the three ballistic
missiles launched on May 12, 2022, including the
possibility that they were SRBM C.
(iv) SRBMs launched in March 2021
On March 25, 2021, North Korea launched two new-type
SRBMs (called “new-type tactical guided missile” by
North Korea) that had never been launched previously.
This missile is presumed to have the same system as the
one mounted on the five-axle TEL which appeared in the
military parade in January of the same year. It has been
pointed out that the launched missile may have been
developed based on the SRBM A, which is believed to
be capable of flying at lower altitudes than conventional
ballistic missiles with irregular trajectories.21 Taking
this into account, it is estimated that the missiles flew
approximately 600 km.
In addition, North Korea carried out two launches of
what could have been SRBMs on July 31, 2019 and another
two a couple of days later, on August 2.
Through such launches, North Korea appears to
be pursuing enhancement of related technologies and
operational capabilities, including enhancing secrecy and
instantaneity, to make it difficult to detect signs of a launch.
It also appears to be improving its ability to conduct
surprise attacks and its continuous fire capability, as well
as missile flight at low altitudes with irregular trajectories.
Considering the distances flown, it would appear that not
only the ROK, but also parts of Japan would be within
Chapter
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Defense Policies of Countries
Transporter-Erector-Launcher (TEL)19 or railway car, with
the characteristic radial exhausts of solid fuel-propelled
engines identifiable on each of the images.
(i) SRBM A
The SRBM (described by North Korea as “new type of
tactical guided weapon”) launched in 2019 on May 4 and
9, July 25, and August 6 as well as on January 27, 2022 are
all presumed to have the same system. Two missiles were
launched on each of the aforementioned dates and flew up to
approximately 600 km. In terms of the shape, the launched
missiles have a similarity to that of the Russian short-range
ballistic missile “Iskander.” It is also presumed that this
missile is able to fly at a lower altitude than conventional
ballistic missiles with an irregular trajectory, and that it is
pointed out that it can carry nuclear warheads.20
North Korea also launched two SRBMs on both
September 15, 2021 and January 14, 2022. Based on images
released by North Korea, these missiles were launched
from railway cars that appear to have been converted from
ordinary freight cars. They have external similarities with
SRBM A, and it is possible that they were developed based
on that missile. North Korea has announced that it was a
firing drill by the “railway-borne missile regiment,” and
has also expressed its intention to expand the formation in
the future.
In this way, North Korea has been pursuing the
operationalization of the SRBM A while diversifying its
launch modes towards its mass production and deployment,
and future developments will be closely watched.
(ii) SRBM B
The SRBM (described by North Korea as “new weapon”
or as “tactical guided weapon”) launched on August 10 and
16, 2019, on March 21, 2020, and on January 17, 2022 are
all presumed to have the same system and to be of a different
type from the aforementioned SRBM A. Two missiles were
launched on each of the aforementioned dates and flew
approximately 250-400 km. It is also presumed that this
missile is able to fly at a lower altitude than conventional
ballistic missiles with an irregular trajectory.
(iii) SRBM C
The signs of a launch from a fixed launcher are easy for the adversary to detect and are vulnerable to attack by the adversary. TEL was developed mainly by the former Soviet Union, among
others, in order to make the detection of launch signs more difficult and increase survivability. According to the National Air and Space Intelligence Center’s “Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat”
published in January 2021, North Korea possesses a maximum of 100 TELs for Scuds, 100 TELs for Nodongs, and 50 TELs for IRBMs (Musudans).
As for a TEL-mounted missile launch, it is deemed difficult to detect individual specific signs in advance concerning the detailed location and timing of the launch. This is because it is operated
by being mounted and transported on a TEL, and furthermore, military-related underground facilities are thought to exist all over North Korea.
Along with activities related to the development of ballistic missiles, developments related to the building of TELs require close watch as they concern the operational capabilities of ballistic
missiles by North Korea.
According to the Congressional Research Service’s “North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons and Missile Programs” (updated December 2021) and others.
In April 2021, ROK Defense Minister Suh Wook answered in the ROK National Assembly that the missile flew in a “pull-up maneuver.” In addition, the “Midterm Report of the Panel of Experts of
the UN Security Council Sanctions Committee on North Korea” published in October 2021 also pointed out that the missile performed as “pull-up maneuver.”
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