Korean Peninsula Section 4
May 2017 is equipped with a MaRV. Images of the 2019
ballistic missile launches published by North Korea show
that the missiles were launched from different places and
hit the specific target. This suggests that North Korea is
aiming to enhance the accuracy of attacks by upgrading
its existing ballistic missiles and developing new ballistic
missiles.
Furthermore, in the short-range ballistic missile launches
on November 28, 2019 and March 2, 2020, the interval
between launching the two missiles on both occasions
was estimated at less than 1 minute, suggesting that North
Korea is trying to improve the continuous fire capability
required for saturation attacks and the like.
Thirdly, North Korea appears to be seeking to improve
its ability to conduct surprise attacks by enhancing secrecy
and instantaneity to make it difficult to detect signs of a
launch.
Using a TEL or submarine, a ballistic missile that can be
launched from any point, makes it difficult to detect signs
of it in advance. North Korea has repeatedly launched
ballistic missiles from TELs and SLBMs. Furthermore,
since September 2021, it has also fired rail-launched
ballistic missiles.
In addition, particularly since 2019, North Korea has
repeatedly launched ballistic missiles that appear to have
used solid fuel. It is therefore believed that North Korea is
proceeding with the development of solid-fueled ballistic
missiles. Generally, solid fuel-propelled ballistic missiles
are not only relatively easier to store and handle, but are
also preloaded with solid fuel. Therefore, in comparison
to liquid fuel-propelled missiles, they can be launched
instantly, and the signs of their launch are more difficult to
detect. Furthermore, they can be reloaded more quickly. In
this respect, they are considered to be superior militarily.
Such characteristics are expected to contribute to improving
the ability to conduct surprise attacks.
Fourthly, North Korea is advancing the development
of ballistic missiles that fly at low altitudes with irregular
trajectories in an attempt to breach other states’ missile
defense networks. SRBM A and SRBM B are believed to
be capable of flying at lower altitudes than conventional
ballistic missiles with irregular trajectories. In addition,
rail-launched ballistic missiles and new types of SLBMs
launched after 2021 all have external similarities with
SRBM A and fly with irregular trajectories.
Furthermore, since September of the same year,
North Korea has also repeatedly launched what it calls
“hypersonic missiles.” In this way, North Korea is believed
DEFENSE WHITE PAPER
Chapter
3
Defense Policies of Countries
on the day of the launch of a “Hwasong-15” ICBM-class
ballistic missile which could have a range of over 10,000
km depending on the weight of its warhead, claiming
that it had re-verified warhead reliability in a reentry
environment, is displaying an intention to seek to secure
and enhance technology aimed at the operationalization of
long-range ballistic missiles.
In addition, based on the flight trajectory at the time, the
ICBM-class ballistic missile launched by North Korea on
March 24, 2022 can be assumed to have a range in excess
of 15,000 km depending on the weight of the warhead
deployed, etc., in which case the entire U.S. would fall
within its range.
Should North Korea make further progress in the
development of ballistic missiles, including the acquiring
of reentry technologies related to long range ballistic
missiles, it may come to have a one-sided understanding
that it has secured a strategic deterrence against the United
States. If North Korea has such a false sense of confidence
and recognition regarding its deterrence, it could lead to an
increase and escalation of military provocations by North
Korea in the region and could create situations that are
deeply worrying also for Japan.
North Korea is presumed to have acquired the atmospheric
re-entry technologies required for the operationalization
of Nodong and Scud-ER ballistic missiles, within whose
range Japan lies, suggesting that it already has the ability to
attack Japan with nuclear weapons fitted to these ballistic
missiles.
Secondly, North Korea may be aiming to enhance
the accuracy, continuous fire capability, and operational
capabilities necessary for saturation attacks and the like.
As for the Scud and Nodong, since 2014, they have been
launched from unprecedented locations, cutting across
the Korean Peninsula, in the early morning and late hours
of the night using TELs, often in multiple numbers. This
indicates the ability to launch Scud and Nodong missiles
from any place and at any time.
In addition, the four ballistic missiles, apparently
Scud ERs, launched on March 6, 2017, were launched
simultaneously. Furthermore, in recent years, North Korea
has conducted target practice combining SRBMs with
various types of artillery. Through such launches, North
Korea may be working to improve not only its research
and development of ballistic missiles but also its actual
operational capabilities.
Some have noted that a ballistic missile which appears
to have been modified from the Scud missile launched in
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