Part I
Security Environment Surrounding Japan
Area Defense (THAAD)32 was temporarily deployed by
the U.S. Forces Korea in September 2017. In addition,
in a U.S.-ROK summit meeting also held in September,
the enhanced deployment of U.S. strategic assets in and
around the ROK on a rotational basis was agreed.
Recently, at the 53rd SCM in December 2021, the United
States and ROK expanded their Alliance from the Korean
Peninsula and Northeast Asia to the Indo-Pacific region,
approved new Strategic Planning Guidance (SPG) after not
doing so for 11 years, and updated their operation plans
based on the SPG. In regard to this, the United States and
the ROK stated that this reflected “changes to the strategic
environment,” including the North Korean threat. It has
been pointed out that the background includes factors such
as the increasing sophistication of North Korea’s nuclear
and missile capabilities.
On the other hand, in regard to joint U.S.-ROK military
exercises, the United States and the ROK have suspended
large-scale maneuver exercises and reduced the scale of
command exercises since 2018 in response to progress in
dialogue with North Korea.33 They have also reduced the
scale of and postponed exercises since 2020 due to factors
such as the impact of COVID-19.
Moreover, at the new year press conference in January
2021, then President Moon Jae-in mentioned in relation to
U.S.-ROK joint military training that North Korea would
react sensitively to every exercise, and that it would be
possible to have a discussion with North Korea through
the Inter-Korean Joint Military Committee. However, even
after 2021, regular U.S.-ROK joint command exercises and
other exercises have been conducted on a reduced scale.
At the same time, the two countries have worked to deal
with such issues as the transition of operational control
(OPCON) to the ROK34 and the realignment of U.S. Forces
Korea.
For the transition of OPCON to the ROK, the roadmap
for the transfer “Strategic Alliance 2015” was established
in October 2010. Aiming to complete the transition by
December 1, 2015, the two countries have reviewed the
approach of transitioning from the existing combined
defense arrangement of the U.S. and ROK Forces, to a
new joint defense arrangement led by the ROK Forces and
Chapter
3
Defense Policies of Countries
32
33
34
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supported by the U.S. Forces.
Nevertheless, based on the increasing seriousness of
North Korea’s nuclear and missile threats, the two sides
decided at the 46th SCM to re-postpone the transition of
OPCON, and to adopt a conditions-based approach, i.e.,
implementing the transition when conditions such as the
ROK Forces’ enhanced capabilities are met. At the 50th
SCM in October 2018, it was decided that following the
transition of OPCON, a ROK military officer will serve
as commander of the Future Combined Forces Command,
replacing the current arrangement of a U.S. military officer
serving as the commander of the U.S.-ROK Combined
Forces.
In August 2019, the Initial Operating Capability (IOC)
verification regarding the ROK Forces’ operational
capabilities was conducted during combined command
post exercises. At the 51st SCM in November 2019, the
two parties concurred that the exercise had played an
important role in verifying IOC and decided to pursue an
assessment of Full Operational Capability for the Future
Combined Forces Command in 2020. However, due to the
impact of COVID-19 and other factors, the preliminary
exercise was only conducted in the same year and in 2021.
At the 53rd SCM in December 2021, it was decided that
the FOC assessment would be conducted in 2022.
The ROK Forces plan to enhance and expand early
the military capabilities leading the U.S.-ROK Alliance
and defense capabilities needed to address North Korean
nuclear and missile threat, which are required for the
transition of OPCON, and accelerate the transition of
OPCON through periodic evaluations of readiness.
With regard to the realignment of the U.S. Forces Korea,
an agreement was reached in 2003 on the relocation of the
U.S. Forces’ Yongsan Garrison located in the center of
Seoul to the Pyeontaek area, south of Seoul, and on the
relocation of the U.S. Forces stationed north of the Han
River to the south of the river. Subsequently, however,
the agreement has been partially revised, due to various
factors, including: in relation to the postponement of the
transition of OPCON, it has been necessary for some U.S.
Forces personnel to remain at Yongsan Garrison; and it was
decided that the counter-fires forces of U.S. Forces Korea
A ballistic missile defense system designed to intercept short- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles in their terminal phase from the ground. It captures and intercepts targets at high altitudes
outside of the atmosphere or in the upper atmosphere. See Part III, Chapter 1, Section 2 regarding the ballistic missile defense system
In regard to “Freedom Guardian” and “Key Resolve,” “new combined command post training” to replace these exercises have been conducted once in both the first and second half of the year
starting in 2019.
The United States and the ROK have had the U.S.-ROK Combined Forces Command since 1978 in order to operate the U.S.-ROK combined defense system to deter wars on the Korean Peninsula
and to perform effective combined operations in the case of a contingency. Under the U.S.-ROK combined defense system, OPCON over the ROK Forces is to be exercised by the Chairman of the
Korea Joint Chiefs of Staff in peacetime and by the Commander of the U.S. Forces Korea, who concurrently serves as the Commander of the Combined Forces Command, in a contingency.
DEFENSE OF JAPAN 2022
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