Part I
Security Environment Surrounding Japan
they attempt to breach missile defense networks by
making their early detection more difficult.
See
Fig. I-4-6-2 (Classification of Ballistic Missiles)
The deployment of ballistic missiles in areas with
continuous armed conflicts is dangerous because it can
intensify existing tensions and make the area unstable.
Furthermore, ballistic missiles are used as a means of
attacking from a distance or threatening another country
that has superior conventional forces.
In recent years, along with the threat of ballistic
missiles, analysts have pointed to the threat of cruise
4
Growing Concerns about Transfer and Proliferation of WMDs and Other Technologies
Even weapons that were purchased or developed for
self-defense purposes could easily be exported or
transferred once domestic manufacturing becomes
successful. For example, certain states that do not heed
political risks have transferred WMDs and related
technologies to other states that cannot afford to invest
resources in conventional forces and attempt to offset
this with WMDs. Some of these states that seek WMDs
do not hesitate to put their land and people at risk, and
furthermore, due to their weak governance, terrorist
organizations are active in their territories. Therefore,
it is conceivable that in general, the possibility of actual
use of WMDs would increase.
Moreover, since it is uncertain whether such states can
effectively manage the related technology and materials,
there is a concern that chemical or nuclear substances
will be transferred or smuggled out from these states
with high likelihood. For example, there is a danger that
even terrorists who do not possess related technologies
would use a dirty bomb to release radioactive materials
for pollution as a means of terrorist attack so long as
they gain access to such materials. States across the
world share concerns regarding the acquisition and use
of WMDs by terrorists and other nonstate actors.
The proliferation of WMDs and other related
technologies has been noted in numerous instances. For
example, in February 2004, it came to light that nuclearrelated technologies, mainly uranium enrichment
Chapter
4
Trends Concerning New Domains including Outer Space, Cyberspace, and Electromagnetic Spectrum,
and Challenges Facing the International Community
5
6
7
8
185
missiles as a weapon which is comparatively easy for
terrorists and other non-state actors to acquire and has
the potential for proliferation. Because cruise missiles
are cheaper to produce compared to ballistic missiles
and are easy to maintain and train with, many countries
either produce or modify cruise missiles. Moreover,
because of cruise missiles’ relatively higher target
accuracy, their difficulty to be detected while flying,
and their relatively smaller size compared to ballistic
missiles, they can be concealed on a ship to secretly
approach a target, and they can present a serious threat
if they carry WMDs with their warheads.
technology, had been transferred to North Korea, Iran,
and Libya by Dr. A.Q. Khan and other scientists in
Pakistan. It has also been suggested that North Korea
supported Syria’s secret nuclear activities.5
Furthermore, there has been significant transfer and
proliferation of ballistic missiles that serve as means
of weapon delivery. The former Soviet Union and
other countries exported Scud-B to many countries and
regions, including Iraq, North Korea, and Afghanistan.
China and North Korea also exported DF-3 (CSS-2) and
Scud missiles, respectively. As a result, a considerable
number of countries and other actors now possess
ballistic missiles. For example, in recent years, the
opposition insurgent group Houthis, based in Northern
Yemen, sporadically attacks Saudi Arabia and the
United Arab Emirates (UAE) with ballistic missiles and
other weapons. It is pointed out that the group receives
their weapons from Iran.6
It is pointed out that North Korea continues to be
an outward source of proliferation of technologies,
conventional weapons and items for supply chains
related to WMDs. For example, it has been pointed out
that the Transporter-Erector-Launcher (TEL) for two
types of short-range ballistic missile test launched in
2019 were in sand or tan color for marketing purposes.7
It has also been pointed out that North Korea cooperates
with Iran to develop long range missiles.8
North Korea made rapid strides in the development
According to “Worldwide Threat Assessment,” U.S. Director of National Intelligence (January 2014).
See Chapter 2, Section 10-5 for situations related to the Houthi movement.
According to “the final report of the Panel of Experts of the UN Security Council Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) Sanctions Committee” (April 2020).
According to “the final report of the Panel of Experts of the UN Security Council Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) Sanctions Committee” (March 2021).
DEFENSE OF JAPAN 2022
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