Part I Security Environment Surrounding Japan they attempt to breach missile defense networks by making their early detection more difficult. See Fig. I-4-6-2 (Classification of Ballistic Missiles) The deployment of ballistic missiles in areas with continuous armed conflicts is dangerous because it can intensify existing tensions and make the area unstable. Furthermore, ballistic missiles are used as a means of attacking from a distance or threatening another country that has superior conventional forces. In recent years, along with the threat of ballistic missiles, analysts have pointed to the threat of cruise 4 Growing Concerns about Transfer and Proliferation of WMDs and Other Technologies Even weapons that were purchased or developed for self-defense purposes could easily be exported or transferred once domestic manufacturing becomes successful. For example, certain states that do not heed political risks have transferred WMDs and related technologies to other states that cannot afford to invest resources in conventional forces and attempt to offset this with WMDs. Some of these states that seek WMDs do not hesitate to put their land and people at risk, and furthermore, due to their weak governance, terrorist organizations are active in their territories. Therefore, it is conceivable that in general, the possibility of actual use of WMDs would increase. Moreover, since it is uncertain whether such states can effectively manage the related technology and materials, there is a concern that chemical or nuclear substances will be transferred or smuggled out from these states with high likelihood. For example, there is a danger that even terrorists who do not possess related technologies would use a dirty bomb to release radioactive materials for pollution as a means of terrorist attack so long as they gain access to such materials. States across the world share concerns regarding the acquisition and use of WMDs by terrorists and other nonstate actors. The proliferation of WMDs and other related technologies has been noted in numerous instances. For example, in February 2004, it came to light that nuclearrelated technologies, mainly uranium enrichment Chapter 4 Trends Concerning New Domains including Outer Space, Cyberspace, and Electromagnetic Spectrum, and Challenges Facing the International Community 5 6 7 8 185 missiles as a weapon which is comparatively easy for terrorists and other non-state actors to acquire and has the potential for proliferation. Because cruise missiles are cheaper to produce compared to ballistic missiles and are easy to maintain and train with, many countries either produce or modify cruise missiles. Moreover, because of cruise missiles’ relatively higher target accuracy, their difficulty to be detected while flying, and their relatively smaller size compared to ballistic missiles, they can be concealed on a ship to secretly approach a target, and they can present a serious threat if they carry WMDs with their warheads. technology, had been transferred to North Korea, Iran, and Libya by Dr. A.Q. Khan and other scientists in Pakistan. It has also been suggested that North Korea supported Syria’s secret nuclear activities.5 Furthermore, there has been significant transfer and proliferation of ballistic missiles that serve as means of weapon delivery. The former Soviet Union and other countries exported Scud-B to many countries and regions, including Iraq, North Korea, and Afghanistan. China and North Korea also exported DF-3 (CSS-2) and Scud missiles, respectively. As a result, a considerable number of countries and other actors now possess ballistic missiles. For example, in recent years, the opposition insurgent group Houthis, based in Northern Yemen, sporadically attacks Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) with ballistic missiles and other weapons. It is pointed out that the group receives their weapons from Iran.6 It is pointed out that North Korea continues to be an outward source of proliferation of technologies, conventional weapons and items for supply chains related to WMDs. For example, it has been pointed out that the Transporter-Erector-Launcher (TEL) for two types of short-range ballistic missile test launched in 2019 were in sand or tan color for marketing purposes.7 It has also been pointed out that North Korea cooperates with Iran to develop long range missiles.8 North Korea made rapid strides in the development According to “Worldwide Threat Assessment,” U.S. Director of National Intelligence (January 2014). See Chapter 2, Section 10-5 for situations related to the Houthi movement. According to “the final report of the Panel of Experts of the UN Security Council Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) Sanctions Committee” (April 2020). According to “the final report of the Panel of Experts of the UN Security Council Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) Sanctions Committee” (March 2021). DEFENSE OF JAPAN 2022

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