Korean Peninsula Section 4
1
North Korea
1 General Situation
1
2
3
Chapter
3
Defense Policies of Countries
In March 2013, Chairman Kim Jong-un1 adopted the
“Byungjin line” policy of simultaneous economic and
nuclear development. At the 7th Congress of the Korean
Workers’ Party (KWP) in May 2016, he made it clear that
he would uphold the “Byungjin line” as well as the “Songun
politics.”2 Between 2016 and 2017, North Korea pushed
ahead with three nuclear tests and as many as 40 ballistic
missile launches. The international community responded
by imposing sanctions under relevant UN Security Council
resolutions, while Japan and the United States were among
those who strengthened their own sanctions against North
Korea.
On the other hand, in April 2018, Chairman Kim
declared that the “Byungjin line” had been successfully
carried out as the development of the state nuclear force had
been completed. He also announced that the “new strategic
line” was that the whole of the party and the whole of the
state would fully concentrate efforts on the construction
of a socialist economy. In addition, North Korea decided
to discontinue “nuclear test and inter-continental ballistic
rocket test-fire,” announcing in May 2018 that the nuclear
test ground had been blown up. During the U.S.-North
Korea summit meeting that June, Chairman Kim expressed
the intention to work towards denuclearization of the
Korean Peninsula.
However, the February 2019 U.S.-North Korea
summit meeting ended without the two sides reaching
an agreement. In December of the same year, Chairman
Kim announced the intention to continue developing
strategic weapons until the United States rolled back its
hostile policy towards North Korea. In addition, at the
8th Congress of the KWP in January 2021, North Korea
showed its hostile stance towards the United States. At the
same time, it showed its stance of continuing development
of its nuclear and missile capabilities, including to “further
strengthen the nuclear war deterrent while doing our best to
build up the most powerful military strength.”
In another speech in October of the same year, Chairman
Kim stated that “our arch-enemy is the war itself” and
emphasized that the possession of military capabilities
constituted the “self-defensive and mandatory right” of a
sovereign nation, and that strengthening military capabilities
was the Party’s “priority policy.” Since February 2022,
North Korea has resumed launches of intercontinental
ballistic missile (ICBM)-class ballistic missiles. Following
the March 24 launch in particular, North Korea reiterated
its intent to enhance its related technologies, announcing
that it will continue to strengthen its nuclear capabilities
while widely publicizing the launch of a new type of
ICBM-class ballistic missile. These remarks indicate that
North Korea will continue to make efforts to maintain and
enhance its military capabilities and combat readiness,
including its nuclear and missile capabilities. According
to the official announcement at the Supreme People’s
Assembly in February 2022, the proportion of the defense
budget in the FY2022 budget of North Korea was 15.9%.
However, it is believed that this represents only a fraction
of the real defense expenditures.
North Korea has continued to promote the development
of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and ballistic
missiles and the enhancement of its operation capabilities,
including by conducting six nuclear tests in the past and
repeatedly launching ballistic missiles in recent years.
Technologically, North Korea is considered to have already
miniaturized nuclear weapons to fit ballistic missile
warheads and possess the capability to launch an attack on
Japan with a ballistic missile fitted with a nuclear warhead.
Furthermore, in January 2021, Chairman Kim mentioned
the development of “ultra-modern tactical nuclear
weapons, including intermediate-range cruise missiles.” In
September of the same year and in January 2022, North
Korea announced that it had succeeded in conducting test
launches of long-range cruise missiles.3Moreover, North
Korea is assessed to possess large-scale cyber units as
part of its asymmetric military capabilities, engaging in
theft of military secrets and developing capabilities to
As of 2013, Kim Jong-un held the position of the First Chairman of the National Defense Commission. At the Supreme People’s Assembly in June 2016, the National Defense Commission was
renamed the State Affairs Commission, and Kim Jong-un assumed the position of Chairman of the State Affairs Commission. Reflecting this change, “Chairman of the State Affairs Commission”
is used for the title of Kim Jong-un throughout this white paper.
In a written decision of the 7th Congress of the KWP, “Report on the Work of the KWP Central Committee” (May 8, 2016), it has been defined as a basic form of socialist politics that leads the
great undertaking of socialism to victory by giving priority to the military forces in all activities under the principle of military first, and strengthening and relying on the actors in the revolution with
the Korean People’s Army (KPA) acting as the central and main force.
On September 13, 2021, North Korea announced that it successfully test-fired newly-developed long-range cruise missiles on September 11 and 12, and that the missiles had flown for about two
hours and hit a target 1,500 km away. In addition, on January 28, 2022, North Korea announced that on January 25, 2022, it launched a long-range cruise missile, believed to be of a different
type from the aforementioned missile, which hit a target 1,800 km away.
DEFENSE WHITE PAPER
78
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