Part I Security Environment Surrounding Japan missile (SLBM). In addition, since entering into 2022, North Korea has resumed launches of intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM)-class and longer range ballistic missiles, which it had not done since 2018, unilaterally escalating its provocations even as the international community was responding to Russia’s aggression of Ukraine. After launching an ICBM-class ballistic missile on March 24 of that year, it stated that it would strengthen its nuclear capabilities and develop further means of attack. Such recent remarkable development of nuclear and missilerelated technologies by North Korea cannot be overlooked for the security of Japan and the region. This series of actions by North Korea threatens the peace and security of Japan, the region, and the international community. With it still maintaining its stance of turning its back on the international community to continue developing nuclear and ballistic missiles, it is necessary for Japan to continue carefully monitoring trends in what actions North Korea takes moving forward. Chapter 3 Defense Policies of Countries (1) Nuclear Weapons a. The Current Status of the Nuclear Weapons Program Details of the current status of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program are largely unclear because North Korea remains an extremely closed regime. However, considering that North Korea has already conducted six nuclear tests, it is conceivable that North Korea has made considerable progress in its nuclear weapons program. With regard to plutonium, a fissile material that can be used for nuclear weapons,8 North Korea has suggested its production and extraction on several instances.9 As for recent activities, in September 2015, North Korea announced that all nuclear facilities in Yongbyon, including the nuclear reactor and the reprocessing facility, the disablement of which was agreed upon at the fifth and the sixth round of the Six-Party Talks in February and September 2007, respectively, had been readjusted and had started normal operation. Because the restarting of the reactor could lead to the production and extraction of plutonium by North Korea, those activities are causes of 8 9 10 81 Object claimed to be a hydrogen bomb loaded on ICBM [AFP=Jiji] great concern. As for highly enriched uranium that can also be used for nuclear weapons, in June 2009, North Korea declared the commencement of uranium enrichment. In November 2010, North Korea disclosed its uranium enrichment facility to American nuclear specialists and later announced that it was operating a uranium enrichment plant equipped with thousands of centrifuges. The expansion of this uranium enrichment plant has been suggested in recent years; in this regard, North Korea could have increased its enrichment capabilities. The series of North Korean behaviors related to uranium enrichment indicate the possibility of the development of nuclear weapons using highly enriched uranium in addition to plutonium.10 In general, facilities used for uranium enrichment are more secretive in appearance than reactors used for plutonium production, and it is difficult to ascertain their activities from the outside. On the other hand, plutonium has a smaller critical mass than uranium, and it is pointed out that it is easier to make nuclear weapons smaller and lighter. In light of both these advantages, North Korea may continue to promote the development of both plutonium and uranium types of nuclear weapons. In regard to related nuclear activities, North Korea is believed to be continuing to promote the improvement of its nuclear capabilities. A report compiled by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in August 2021 pointed out that there were signs that some nuclear-related facilities Plutonium is synthetically produced in a nuclear reactor by irradiating uranium with neutrons, and then extracting it from used nuclear fuel at a reprocessing facility. Plutonium is then used as a basic material for the production of nuclear weapons. Meanwhile, in order to use uranium for nuclear weapons, it is necessary to extract uranium 235 (U235), a highly fissile material, from natural uranium. This process is called enrichment. Generally, a large-scale enrichment facility that combines thousands of centrifuges is used to boost the U235 concentration to nuclear weapon levels (over 90%). North Korea announced in October 2003 that it had completed the reprocessing of 8,000 used fuel rods that contain plutonium, and in May 2005 that it had completed extraction of an additional 8,000 used fuel rods. The 2020 Defense White Paper of the ROK estimates that North Korea possesses around 50 kg of plutonium, retaining the assessment given in the 2018 Defense White Paper. The 2020 Defense White Paper of the ROK assesses that North Korea possesses a substantial amount of highly enriched uranium (HEU). It has been noted that a uranium enrichment facility different from the one in Yongbyon exists in Kangson. DEFENSE OF JAPAN 2022

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