initially identified at the outset of a case. As noted by one responding country: ‘Some of these [crimes]
may be more common [than those reported].’17
Many responding countries reported strategies and approaches used to increase reporting of
cybercrime. As shown in Figure 5.2 these include the use of public awareness campaigns, creation of
online and hotline reporting systems, liaison with private sector organizations, and enhanced police
outreach and information
sharing. Out of almost 60
Figure 5.2: Measures taken to increase reporting of cybercrime to
police
responding countries, less
28%
than 10 per cent reported
Public Awareness
not having taken any
measures
aimed
at
14%
Hotlines & Online Portals
increasing reporting of
Public‐Private
cybercrime acts.18
Liaison/Cooperation
Enhanced Police Response
Country
14%
responses also showed the
No Measures Taken
38%
need for law enforcement
6%
authorities to work closely
Source: Study cybercrime questionnaire. Q79. (n=57, r=107)
with other stakeholders,
such as the private sector – in order to increase reporting and for intelligence purposes. One
country, for example, highlighted that it was important to ‘establish 24 hour connectivity between important
website administrators, ISPs, police and a centre for coordination of security incidents.’ Another country in the
Americas reported that ‘The Federal Police is pursuing agreements with public and private companies so that
crimes committed against those companies and their clients are informed electronically to the Federal Police.’19
Overall, however, the comparatively low proportion of cybercrime acts reported by company
victims or internet service providers, suggests that additional outreach and development of publicprivate partnerships may be needed, in order to strengthen reporting of cybercrime acts from these
sources. The development of public-private partnerships and service provider responsibilities is
discussed further in Chapter Eight (Prevention). Interactions between law enforcement and third
party service providers during police investigations are addressed below in this Chapter.
A notable feature from Figure 5.1 is the low proportion of cybercrime acts that are detected
by law enforcement investigators in the absence of victim reports. Accordingly, responding
countries did not, in general, refer to proactive investigations in written responses to the
questionnaire. One country did, however, note that ‘In some cases cybercrime acts come to the attention of the
police while police [are] performing operational activities.’20 Another country, in Europe, also reported that
‘For child pornography offences, the investigations start mostly from information coming from other police forces, and
open sources,’ indicating underlying police intelligence work.
The distribution of the source of identified cybercrime acts is indicative, in part, of the
challenge of addressing both strategic and tactical policing objectives. Strategic policing objectives are
threat-driven and relate to longer-term law enforcement goals, with a focus on the root causes and
circumstances of serious crime. Tactical policing objectives are incident-driven and time-sensitive,
with an emphasis on preserving evidence and following investigative leads. In the case of
cybercrime, the investment in police time and resources required for responding to individual cases
17
18
19
20
Study cybercrime questionnaire. Q80.
Study cybercrime questionnaire. Q79.
Study cybercrime questionnaire. Q79.
Study cybercrime questionnaire. Q78.
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