5.2 Investigative powers overview
KEY RESULTS:
Many countries outside of Europe perceive their national legal frameworks to be
insufficient for the investigation of cybercrime
Overall, national approaches to cybercrime investigative powers show less core
commonality than for criminalization
While legal approaches vary, key investigative powers required include search and
seizure, orders for computer data, real-time collection of data, and data preservation
Across ten investigative measures, countries most often reported the existence of
general (non-cyber-specific) powers. A number of countries reported cyber-specific
legislation, notably for ensuring expedited preservation of computer data and for
obtaining stored subscriber data
Many countries reported a lack of legal power for advanced investigative measures, such
as remote computer forensics
Cyber-specific and general investigative powers
The evidence of cybercrime acts is almost always in electronic, or digital, form. This data
can be stored or transient, and can exist in the form of computer files, transmissions, logs, metadata,
or network data. Obtaining such evidence requires an amalgamation of traditional and new
policing techniques. Law enforcement authorities may use ‘traditional’ police work
(interviewing victims or undercover visual surveillance of suspects) in some stages of an
investigation, but require computer-specific approaches for other parts. These can include
viewing, and seizing or copying, computer data from devices belonging to suspects; obtaining
computer data from third parties such as internet service providers, and – where necessary –
intercepting electronic communications.
While some of these investigative actions can be achieved with traditional powers,
many procedural provisions do not translate well from a spatial, object-oriented approach to
one involving electronic data storage and real-time data flows. In some countries, computer data
can be covered by ‘traditional’ powers of search and seizure of ‘anything’ believed to be relevant to
an offence. Existing ‘wiretap’ or ‘communications interception’ laws may also provide sufficient
authority for some aspects of cybercrime investigations. In other countries, however, traditional
procedural laws might not be capable of being interpreted to include intangible data or IP-based
communications. In addition, investigative powers must be able to address challenges such as the
volatile nature of electronic evidence, and use of obfuscation techniques by perpetrators – including
the use of encryption, proxies, cloud computing service, ‘innocent’ computer systems infected with
malware, and multiple (or ‘onion’) routing of internet connections.29 These aspects, in particular,
29
See, for example, Feigenbaum et al., 2007. A Model of Onion Routing with Provable Anonymity. Financial Cryptography and Data
Security Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 4886:57-71; and Schwerha, J.J., 2010. Law Enforcement Challenges in Transborder Acquisition of
Electronic Evidence from “Cloud Computing Providers,” Council of Europe Discussion paper, pp.9-10; Walden, I., 2013. Accessing Data in
the Cloud: The Long Arm of the Law Enforcement Agent. Privacy and Security for Cloud Computing. Computer Communications and
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