CHAPTER FIVE: LAW ENFORCEMENT AND INVESTIGATIONS
In many countries, such orders may be
possible under existing investigative powers, such as
general production orders, or document disclosure
orders. Nonetheless, procedural challenges can also
arise. These could include in respect of ‘traditional’
requirements for identifying information about a suspect
before orders for evidence can be made. In
cybercrime investigations, at the time of request to an
internet service provider, the only known
information may be an IP-address or similar
connection-based information.
Order for computer data: National example
from a country in the Americas
If a magistrate is satisfied on the basis of an
application by a police officer that specified
computer data, or a printout or other
information, is reasonably required for the
purpose of a criminal investigation or criminal
proceedings, the magistrate may order that(a) a person in the territory of <country> in
control of a computer produce from the
computer specified data or a printout or
other intelligible output of that data;
(b) an Internet service provider in <country>
produce information about persons who
subscribe to or otherwise use the service; or
(c) a person in the territory of <country> who
has access to a specified computer process
and compile specified computer data from
the computer and give it to a specified
person
Accordingly, five international or regional
cybercrime instruments contain specific provisions
regarding orders for obtaining stored data.51 In doing
so, instruments typically refer to the distinction made
earlier in this Chapter – between ‘subscriber’, ‘traffic’,
and ‘content’ data. Such provisions usually concern
information that are in the ‘possession or control’ of the
person or service provider. The order only applies therefore, to the extent that the data are in
existence at the time of the order, and can be retrieved by the subject of the order. The existence of
such investigative powers alone does not in itself oblige service providers to collect or retain
information they would not otherwise so process. In respect of traffic data, some multilateral
instruments52 also include a mechanism for ‘partial’ expeditious disclosure of sufficient traffic data to
enable law authorities to identify the service providers and the path through which the
communication was transmitted. This can be important where multiple service providers are
involved in processing computer data or electronic communications.
Figure 5.7 shows that at the national level, general powers are again predominant amongst
countries for the authorization of orders for subscriber, traffic, and content data.53 The proportion
of countries that employ
Figure 5.7: Order for stored traffic, subcriber and content data
cyber-specific orders for
obtaining subscriber data is
Traffic data
slightly higher than for the
(n=50)
other two data categories. In
addition to the influence of
Cyber‐specific powers
international and regional
Subscriber data
(n=49)
General powers
cybercrime instruments, this
Both
may also reflect a common
Neither
need for this type of data,
Content data
(n=50)
and a requirement on behalf
of service providers for
clear legal powers and
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
procedures in requesting
Source: Study cybercrime questionnaire. Q44, Q45, and Q46. (n=50, 49, 50)
51
52
53
COMESA Draft Model Bill, Art. 36(a); Commonwealth Model Law, Art.15; Council of Europe Cybercrime Convention, Art.
18(1)(a); ITU/CARICOM/CTU Model Legislative Texts, Art.22(a); League of Arab States Convention, Art. 25(1).
COMESA Draft Model Bill, Art. 34(a)(ii); Commonwealth Model Law, Art.16; Council of Europe Cybercrime Convention, Art.
17(1)(b); ITU/CARICOM/CTU Model Legislative Texts, Art.24; League of Arab States Convention, Art. 24.
Study cybercrime questionnaire. Q45-47.
129
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