CHAPTER FIVE: LAW ENFORCEMENT AND INVESTIGATIONS data. In recognition of this challenge, three international or regional instruments contain provisions on ‘trans-border’ access to computer data.67 Such provisions typically envisage that law enforcement authorities may access or receive, through a computer system in the national territory, stored computer data located in another country, with the lawful and voluntary consent of a person who has lawful authority to disclose the data.68 As with remote forensic tools, over one-third of responding countries did not respond to the question in the Study Figure 5.10: Trans‐border access to a computer system questionnaire on existence of powers or data for ‘trans-border’ access. Of those 13% that did, slightly more than half 33% Cyber‐specific powers indicated that such a power existed. Countries interpreted the term General powers widely, however, to also include the Both situation where consent to the Neither 44% measure is obtained from the 10% authorities of the country in which the measure is implemented. One Source: Study cybercrime questionnaire. Q51. (n=39) country, for example, reported that legislation allows for the issue of a warrant permitting the installation of surveillance devices in ‘overseas premises/objects.’ However, this can only be done where a ‘judge… issuing the warrant is satisfied that the surveillance has been agreed to by an ‘appropriate consenting official’ of the foreign country.’69 Some countries that indicated ‘trans-border’ access powers in national law, referred in written comments to the use of mutual legal assistance instruments. Thus, the overall proportion of countries reporting legislative authority for ‘trans-border’ access through the Study questionnaire, may be larger than the group of countries with the power to authorize ‘trans-border’ access in the stricter sense (ie. without authorization from national authorities) envisaged by some international and regional instruments. Chapter Seven (International cooperation) examines issues of direct law enforcement access to extraterritorial data in greater depth – including with reference to police use of such measures in practice. Discussion Examination of the legal basis for investigative powers used in cybercrime (and, indeed, for any crime involving electronic evidence) reveals considerable diversity in approach at national level. This includes regarding the extent to which ‘traditional’ powers can be interpreted to apply to nontangible data, as well as the extent to which legal authority exists for particularly intrusive measures, such as remote forensic investigations. Overall, national approaches to cybercrime investigative powers show less core commonality than for criminalization of many cybercrime acts. Nonetheless, while legal powers vary, a good degree of consensus appears to exist on the types of investigative measure that should be available. These are comparatively straight forward and correspond to those found in many multilateral instruments – (i) powers for search and seizure; (ii) powers for obtaining 67 68 69 See COMESA Draft Model Bill, Art. 49b; Council of Europe Cybercrime Convention, Art. 32b; League of Arab States Convention, Art. 40(2). ‘Trans-border’ access provisons typically distinguish between access to publicly available (open source) material and other material. Access to open source material for criminal justice purposes has become generally accepted practice (See Council of Europe. 2012. Transborder access and jurisdiction: what are the options? Report of the Transborder Group Adopted by the T-CY on 6 December 2012). Use of the term ‘Trans-border’ access in this Study therefore concerns access to non-open source material. Study cybercrime questionnaire. Q42-51. 133

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