CHAPTER FIVE: LAW ENFORCEMENT AND INVESTIGATIONS power (telecommunications data, stored content and live content). These regimes include requirements that must be met before access is granted, limitations on access once granted, limitations of the use of material once accessed, destruction requirements, internal and independent oversight regimes, and public reporting requirements.’89 The majority of countries (over 75 per cent), said that safeguards were build into primary legislation. The remainder of countries reported that safeguards derived from secondary legislation, executive decree, court decisions or law enforcement of prosecution policies.90 While safeguards might legitimately derive from sources other than primary legislation, they must still – as discussed below – be enshrined in ‘law’ that provides adequate and effective guarantees against abuse of the investigative measure itself. Figure 5.12: Legal requirements for use of investigative measures Countries Expedited were also asked preservation of data further detail about Order for Evidence/report of act subscriber data specific procedural Seizure safeguards. These Evidence/report of serious act included the nature Search Probable cause/ of legal reasonable grounds Order for traffic data requirements to be Risk of damage Real‐time collection met before a traffic data particular Other Order for content data investigative Real‐time collection of content data measure could be used, as well as the 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% Source: Study cybercrime questionnaire. Q87‐96. (n=51) identity of authorizing authorities. With respect to procedural requirements, the majority of countries reported that a large range of investigative measures could be initiated on the basis of ‘evidence or report of a [cybercrime] act.’91 For measures with a higher degree of intrusiveness, such as real-time collection of data, or collection of content data, countries more often required evidence or report of a ‘serious’ cybercrime, or procedural requirements such as demonstration of ‘probable cause’ or ‘reasonable grounds’ of suspicion of an offence.92 Figure 5.13: Authorization of investigative measures Expedited preservation of data Order for subscriber data Authorization by law enforcement Seizure Authorization by prosecution Search Order for traffic data Authorization by courts Real‐time collection traffic data Other Order for content data Real‐time collection of content data 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% Source: Study cybercrime questionnaire. Q87‐96. (n=51) 89 90 91 92 Study cybercrime questionnaire. Q100. Ibid. Study cybercrime questionnaire. Q87-96. Ibid. 137 A similar pattern was observed with respect to the identity of the authorizing authority for different investigative measures. Countries frequently reported that comparatively less intrusive measures, such as expedited preservation of data, or orders for subscriber data, could be

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