CHAPTER FIVE: LAW ENFORCEMENT AND INVESTIGATIONS Electronic service providers hold subscriber information, billing invoices, some connection logs, location information (such as cell tower data for mobile providers), and communication content, all of which can represent critical electronic evidence of an offence. Electronic service providers are generally not, however, obliged to affirmatively report criminal activity on their networks to law enforcement, (although in several countries, the identification of child pornography engages a mandatory reporting obligation). As a result, responding countries make use of legal powers to obtain computer data from service providers that is required in the course of a criminal investigation. As discussed above, the majority of responding countries reported the existence of general or cyber-specific powers for ordering supply of data from third parties such as service providers. Responding countries stated, for example, that ‘According to Criminal Procedure Law, a person directing proceedings authorized by prosecutor… can demand necessary retained data that could be related to the crime committed.’124 Countries also noted that ‘police can ask persons and companies to testify as witnesses, hand over data or do anything else that could help the case.’125 Nonetheless, responding country comments indicated that a number of countries either still do not have sufficient legislative powers, or experience challenges in practice in obtaining data.126 A common reported issue was that internet service providers are frequently not under any obligation to retain computer data, and that by the time necessary orders had been authorized, connection logs were no longer available.127 A number of countries also highlighted challenges in resolving privacy issues related to the supply of data by service providers.128 Such challenges were more frequently reported in countries outside of Europe. This pattern is also confirmed by law enforcement responses to a question on the ability to compel non-targets of an investigation to provide information. Figure 5.16 shows that only around 60 per cent of countries in Africa, Asia and Figure 5.16: Law enforcement compel non‐targets to Oceania, and the Americas reported provide information that this was possible. Almost all Europe countries in Europe, on the other (n=25) hand, report the ability to compel Asia & Oceania (n=14) the production of information from third parties. This information Americas Yes (n=12) represents the law enforcement No Africa ‘practical’ perspective, in contrast to (n=9) the earlier data presented in this 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% Chapter on existence of ‘legal’ Source: Study cybercrime questionnaire. Q101. (n=60) power in principle. In practice, law enforcement officers most often reported using formal court orders in order to obtain computer data from service providers. Figure 5.17 shows the relative distribution of responses for methods used to obtain subscriber data, stored traffic and content data, and real-time traffic and content data. As might be expected from its least intrusive nature, methods used to obtain subscriber data were most diverse – including all of orders issued by courts, prosecution, and police. 124 125 126 127 128 Study cybercrime questionnaire. Q101. Ibid. Study cybercrime questionnaire. Q89-91. Ibid. Ibid. 145

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