CHAPTER FIVE: LAW ENFORCEMENT AND INVESTIGATIONS
Electronic service providers hold subscriber information, billing invoices, some
connection logs, location information (such as cell tower data for mobile providers), and
communication content, all of which can represent critical electronic evidence of an offence.
Electronic service providers are generally not, however, obliged to affirmatively report criminal
activity on their networks to law enforcement, (although in several countries, the identification of
child pornography engages a mandatory reporting obligation). As a result, responding countries
make use of legal powers to obtain computer data from service providers that is required in the
course of a criminal investigation. As discussed above, the majority of responding countries reported
the existence of general or cyber-specific powers for ordering supply of data from third parties such
as service providers.
Responding countries stated, for example, that ‘According to Criminal Procedure Law, a person
directing proceedings authorized by prosecutor… can demand necessary retained data that could be related to the crime
committed.’124 Countries also noted that ‘police can ask persons and companies to testify as witnesses, hand over
data or do anything else that could help the case.’125 Nonetheless, responding country comments indicated
that a number of countries either still do not have sufficient legislative powers, or experience
challenges in practice in obtaining data.126 A common reported issue was that internet service
providers are frequently not under any obligation to retain computer data, and that by the time
necessary orders had been authorized, connection logs were no longer available.127 A number of
countries also highlighted challenges in resolving privacy issues related to the supply of data by
service providers.128
Such challenges were more frequently reported in countries outside of Europe. This pattern
is also confirmed by law enforcement responses to a question on the ability to compel non-targets
of an investigation to provide information. Figure 5.16 shows that only around 60 per cent of
countries in Africa, Asia and
Figure 5.16: Law enforcement compel non‐targets to
Oceania, and the Americas reported
provide information
that this was possible. Almost all
Europe
countries in Europe, on the other
(n=25)
hand, report the ability to compel
Asia & Oceania
(n=14)
the production of information from
third parties. This information
Americas
Yes
(n=12)
represents the law enforcement
No
Africa
‘practical’ perspective, in contrast to
(n=9)
the earlier data presented in this
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
Chapter on existence of ‘legal’
Source: Study cybercrime questionnaire. Q101. (n=60)
power in principle.
In practice, law enforcement officers most often reported using formal court orders in
order to obtain computer data from service providers. Figure 5.17 shows the relative distribution of
responses for methods used to obtain subscriber data, stored traffic and content data, and real-time
traffic and content data. As might be expected from its least intrusive nature, methods used to
obtain subscriber data were most diverse – including all of orders issued by courts, prosecution, and
police.
124
125
126
127
128
Study cybercrime questionnaire. Q101.
Ibid.
Study cybercrime questionnaire. Q89-91.
Ibid.
Ibid.
145
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