laws and regulations. However, multinational private sector organizations generally identified a
primary ‘seat’ jurisdiction for the receipt of law enforcement requests globally.145
In addition to a general requirement for due legal process in the jurisdiction of the ‘seat’ of a
corporation, a number of private sector organizations noted that informal foreign law enforcement
requests may also be complied with on a discretionary basis.146 Publically available information for
global service providers such as Google, for example, states both that: ‘Using Mutual Legal Assistance
Treaties and other diplomatic and cooperative arrangements, [foreign] agencies can work through [‘seat’ national
authorities] to gather evidence for legitimate investigations’, and that: ‘On a voluntary basis, we may provide user
data in response to valid legal process from [foreign] agencies, if those requests are consistent with international norms,
[‘seat’ national] law, Google’s polices and the law of the requesting country.’147
This adds up to a picture of a default requirement for foreign law enforcement authorities
to obtain requisite subpoenas, warrants or orders in the ‘seat’ jurisdiction of a service provider,
combined with a certain discretion to supply data to law enforcement within the limits of national
laws and customer terms of use. Such discretionary relationships between the private sector and law
enforcement are largely built on trust and are not considered legally binding – they usually exist
therefore within limited geographic or socio-political areas. One company from Central America, for
example, stated that it accepted obligations derived from informal law enforcement requests, but
limited compliance exclusively to those issued by local authorities.148 One European company
specified that it treated informal requests from foreign law enforcement authorities in the same way
as requests by national authorities, but did not consider itself legally bound to comply in either
scenario.149 As publically noted by one leading online services provider: ‘we are operating in good faith
with… authorities, but we have no obligation to do so… If that good faith is abused, we would have to think much
more carefully about that cooperation.’150 In other words, within the constraints of data protection laws
and customer terms and conditions, service providers have a significant amount of latitude over data
disclosed, including to foreign law enforcement agencies. These decisions are often based on
existing working relationships and perceptions of trust. One global provider of network equipment,
for example, stated that all requests would ‘undergo review, in order to ensure technical feasibility and
alignment with country-specific […] legal and […] human rights regulations.’151
A combination of: (i) varying capacity of foreign law enforcement authorities to ensure due
legal process in the ‘seat’ jurisdiction through mutual legal assistance; and (ii) the existence of
networks of informal trust, results in variation in the extent of compliance with foreign requests for
information by global service providers. Figure 5.18 shows the number of requests received and
complied with from different countries (scaled per 100,000 internet users in the requesting country)
as reported by Google Transparency Report.152 The highest proportion of requests complied with
are in the ‘seat’ jurisdiction. Requests from other countries vary from zero per cent of requests
complied with, to almost 80 per cent, with an average of around 50 per cent complied with. This
pattern likely derives from a number of factors, including: the extent to which foreign law
enforcement requests are made informally or directly, rather than through mutual legal assistance;
corporate policies towards informal requests from different countries; and the capacity of foreign
authorities for the preparation of mutual legal assistance requests.
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
Study cybercrime interviews (private sector). Q28.
Ibid.
See, for example, http://www.google.com/transparencyreport/userdatarequests/legalprocess/
Study cybercrime questionnaire (private sector). Q28.
Ibid.
House of Lords and House of Commoners. Draft Communications Data Bill Joint Committee – First Report. Section 6 (Jurisdictional
issues – Requests addressed to overseas CSPs), 28 November 2012.
Study cybercrime questionnaire (private sector). Q28.
See http://www.google.com/transparencyreport/userdatarequests/
150
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