organized criminal group that engages in criminal activities in more than one state; or (iv) it is committed in one state but has substantial effects in another state.41 The approach contains many important features – including the principle of ‘substantial effects’ within a state. When it comes to cybercrime acts, however, it may not offer a complete approach. As discussed in the section on ‘Cybercrime perpetrators’ in Chapter Two (The global picture) of this Study, there is no reason why ‘organized criminal groups’ should be central to cybercrime acts.42 In addition, due to the global movement of data in internet transactions, a transnational ‘dimension’ may arise that does not amount to ‘preparation, planning, direction or control’ within another state. An approach for cybercrime is to recognize that the determination of a ‘transnational dimension’ makes most sense when examined with reference to considerations of (i) jurisdiction; and (ii) criminal evidence. One method of characterizing any offence, for example, is to differentiate the act elements of ‘conduct’, ‘circumstance’, and ‘result.’43 Where one or more of these elements occurs in, or produces substantial effects within,44 another territorial jurisdiction, a ‘transnational dimension’ will exist. As discussed below, this will, in turn have implications for jurisdictional claims. Under this approach, a single ‘location’ of a cybercrime offence per se may not be determinable – or, indeed, relevant. Rather, what matters is the successful identification of elements or substantial effects that allow a state to establish jurisdiction – subject always to the requirement of a ‘sufficient connection’. In addition, from a broader perspective, a cybercrime transnational ‘dimension’ may arise where part of the modus operandi of the offence occurs in another jurisdiction. The mere presence in extra-territorial servers of computer data related to the offence, for example, might not (depending upon local law) be sufficient to engage the jurisdiction of the server country. It would, however, be highly relevant for evidence and the investigative process of any country claiming jurisdiction – possibly requiring action such as a mutual legal assistance request to the server country. In this situation, a cybercrime case might also be said to have a transnational ‘dimension’. A high number of cybercrime cases likely fall within this category. They may not, however, always be characterized as such – either due to sufficient evidence within the prosecuting jurisdiction, or a failure to identify extra-territorial evidence in the first place. Two themes are particularly important when it comes to the extra-territorial ‘evidence’ dimension: (i) the increasing involvement of electronic evidence in all crime types and not just those falling within the term ‘cybercrime’; and (ii) the increasing use of cloud computing involving distributed and parallel data storage. In particular, automated dynamic data placement within cloud services in data centres physically located in different countries may present challenges to the identification of data ‘location.’45 Following an examination of how international and national 41 42 43 44 45 Organized Crime Convention, Art. 3(2). Although in practice many may be involved. See Chapter Two (The global picture), Section 2.3 Cybercrime perpetrators, Role of organized criminal groups. Fletcher, G., 1978. Rethinking Criminal Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Thus, for example, an offence of ‘computer system interference’ may require the ‘intentional’ (intent) ‘damaging, deleting, altering or suppressing of computer data’ (conduct) ‘seriously hindering’ (result) the ‘functioning of a computer system’ (circumstance). Operation of the ‘effects doctrine’ has been argued to represent an extension of the objective territorial principle, in so far as it does not require an ‘element’ of the offence to be located within the jurisdiction. See, for example, Ahlstrom and Others v Commission of European Communities [1988] ECR 5193. In the cybercrime context, a review of jurisdictional principles relied upon by national courts in extra-territorial cases suggests that ‘whichever characterization [objective territoriality or effects doctrine] a municipal court chooses to rely on, the extent of jurisdiction justified will be the same.’ See Hayashi, M., 2006. Objective Territorial Principle or Effects Doctrine? Jurisdiction and Cyberspace. In: Law 6:284-302, p.285. See, for example, Peterson, Z.N.J., Gondree, M. and Beverly, R., 2011. A Position Paper on Data Sovereignty: The Importance of Geolocating Data in the Cloud. In: Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy (CODASPY). For an 188

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