CHAPTER SEVEN: INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
sufficient, compared with around 67 per cent of countries in Africa, Asia and Oceania. All
responding countries from Europe – all except one of which had either signed or ratified the
Council of Europe Cybercrime Convention – considered their legislation to be sufficient or partly
sufficient.
Countries that did not consider their legislation to be sufficient for extra-territorial acts cited
a number of reasons. Common gaps included either a lack of provisions in criminal codes
addressing acts committed outside of the jurisdiction, as
Common national bases for jurisdiction in
well as, in some cases, the non-applicability of extradition
cybercrime cases
and mutual legal assistance legislation to cybercrime
Territory
acts.49
Country responses to the Study questionnaire
showed that grounds for jurisdiction in extra-territorial
cybercrime cases are primarily based on principles such as
territoriality (including as interpreted by the objective
territoriality principle and substantial effects doctrine)
and the nationality of the offender.50 As such, states
generally require some degree of internal effect, such as
victimization of nationals or effects or damage within the
territory. Respondent countries often reported that if the
crime is committed entirely outside of the country, with no
effects within the territory, then criminalization and
prosecution can be particularly challenging.
Commission of crime partly/wholly
on the territory
Effects/damages within the territory
Computer/programme/data used
for the commission of the crime
located within the territory
Commission on registered ships and
aircrafts (including military)
Nationality
Active – Offender
Habitual residence
Passive – Victim
Other criteria
State interests are affected
Ne bis in idem
Using territorial jurisdiction
International and regional instruments – All international or regional cybercrime instruments that
contain a jurisdiction clause recognize the territorial principle – requiring States parties to exercise
jurisdiction over any offence established in accordance with the instrument, that is ‘committed’
within the state’s geographical territory.51 Criminal activities on ships and aircrafts are also covered
by a number of binding and non-binding instruments.52
In accordance with the objective territoriality principle, many international and regional
instruments recognize that is not necessary for all elements of the offence to occur within the
territory in order for territorial jurisdiction to apply. The Council of Europe Cybercrime Convention
Explanatory Report, for example, clarifies that under the principle of territoriality, a party would
assert territorial jurisdiction if both the person attacking a computer system and the victim system
are located within its territory, ‘and where the computer system attacked is within its territory, even if the attacker
is not.’53
The COMESA Draft Model Bill includes a provision in the instrument itself on the ‘place
49
50
51
52
53
Ibid.
Study cybercrime questionnaire. Q18 and Q19.
See, for example, Council of Europe Cybercrime Convention, Art. 22(1)(a); League of Arab States Convention, Art. 30(1)(a); UN
OP-CRC-SC, Art. 4(1); COMESA Draft Model Bill, Art. 40(a)(1); ITU/CARICOM/CTU Model Legislative Text, Art. 19(a);
Commonwealth Model Law, Art. 4(a).
See, for example, COMESA Draft Model Bill, Art. 40(b); Commonwealth Model Law, Art. 4(b); Council of Europe Cybercrime
Convention, Art. 22(1)(b), (c); Council of Europe Child Protection Convention, Art. 25(1)(b), (c); ITU/CARICOM/CTU Model
Legislative Texts, Art. 19(b); League of Arab States Convention, Arts. 30(1)(b), (c); and United Nations OP-CRC-SC, Art. 4(1).
Council of Europe, 2001. Explanatory Report to Convention on Cybercrime.
191
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