wiretapping or surveillance.127 On the other hand, dual criminality has an important role to play in the protection of a state’s sovereignty over its own law enforcement and criminal justice affairs. Dual criminality protection could, for example, provide a legal basis for countries to refuse requests for supply of electronic evidence concerning internet content-related offences that are not criminalized in the requested country. In cases involving mutual legal assistance and internet content, in particular, additional bases for refusal such as political offence exceptions, state essential interest exceptions,128 and even international human rights obligations may be invoked.129 Indeed, when asked about common reasons for rejection of cybercrime mutual legal assistance requests, ‘breach of human rights obligations’ was specifically highlighted by responding countries.130 Finally, in addition to the question of the existence of a criminal offence in the law of the requested state, many multilateral and bilateral instruments also establish seriousness thresholds for international cooperation requests.131 Thresholds are included, for example, in the Council of Europe Cybercrime Convention and League of Arab States Convention – both of which provide for extradition for offences established in accordance with the Convention ‘punishable under the laws of both Parties’ (dual criminality requirement) by ‘deprivation of liberty… of at least one year, or by a more severe penalty’ (threshold standard).132 During information gathering for the Study, countries reported that cybercrime acts are widely considered to meet seriousness standards – thereby constituting extraditable offences. All responding countries in Europe and the Americas, and 90 per cent of countries in Africa, Asia and Oceania reported that cybercrime acts are, in general, extraditable offences.133 The constraint of dual criminality was highlighted by countries when asked about ‘preconditions’ for cybercrime cooperation requests. Such conditions can be considered to have both a procedural and a Figure 7.6: Pre‐conditions before extradition request in cybercrime cases can be considered substantive nature, and the way in Copy of warrant of arrest or judgment 48% which different Evidence of dual criminality 34% conditions are Evidence that perpetrator is in the jurisdiction 32% considered may Physical description, identification of perpetrator 27% vary between Confirmation of non‐retroactivity 25% countries.134 While countries reported Authenticated statement of facts 23% both procedural Other 18% and substantive Confirmation of complete extent of charge 16% elements, dual Prima‐facie evidence 14% criminality was Minimum penalty 14% nonetheless Source: Study cybercrime questionnaire. Q198. (n=44, r=110) identified as a requirement for 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 Study cybercrime questionnaire. Q198. See, for example, Council of Europe Cybercrime Convention, Art. 29(4). See, for example, Currie, R.J., 2000. Human Rights and International Mutual Legal Assistance: Resolving the Tension. Criminal Law Forum, 11(2):143-181. Study cybercrime questionnaire. Q239. See, for example, Organized Crime Convention, Arts. 2, 3, and 16. Council of Europe Cybercrime Convention, Art. 24. Study cybercrime questionnaire. Q194. For extradition, a copy of the arrest warrant and physical description of the suspect may, for example, be considered as procedural elements subject to an initial ‘regularity’ check. The existence of dual criminality, on the hand, may be considered in depth at an extradition hearing before a judicial authority (Response from regional expert nominated by WEOG to preliminary results from the Study). 204

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