wiretapping or surveillance.127 On the other hand, dual criminality has an important role to play in
the protection of a state’s sovereignty over its own law enforcement and criminal justice affairs.
Dual criminality protection could, for example, provide a legal basis for countries to refuse requests
for supply of electronic evidence concerning internet content-related offences that are not
criminalized in the requested country. In cases involving mutual legal assistance and internet
content, in particular, additional bases for refusal such as political offence exceptions, state essential
interest exceptions,128 and even international human rights obligations may be invoked.129 Indeed,
when asked about common reasons for rejection of cybercrime mutual legal assistance requests,
‘breach of human rights obligations’ was specifically highlighted by responding countries.130
Finally, in addition to the question of the existence of a criminal offence in the law of the
requested state, many multilateral and bilateral instruments also establish seriousness thresholds for
international cooperation requests.131 Thresholds are included, for example, in the Council of
Europe Cybercrime Convention and League of Arab States Convention – both of which provide for
extradition for offences established in accordance with the Convention ‘punishable under the laws of both
Parties’ (dual criminality requirement) by ‘deprivation of liberty… of at least one year, or by a more severe
penalty’ (threshold standard).132 During information gathering for the Study, countries reported that
cybercrime acts are widely considered to meet seriousness standards – thereby constituting
extraditable offences. All responding countries in Europe and the Americas, and 90 per cent of
countries in Africa, Asia and Oceania reported that cybercrime acts are, in general, extraditable
offences.133
The constraint of dual criminality was highlighted by countries when asked about ‘preconditions’ for cybercrime cooperation requests. Such conditions can be considered to have both a
procedural and a
Figure 7.6: Pre‐conditions before extradition request in cybercrime cases can be considered
substantive nature,
and the way in
Copy of warrant of arrest or judgment
48%
which
different
Evidence of dual criminality
34%
conditions
are
Evidence
that
perpetrator
is
in
the
jurisdiction
32%
considered
may
Physical
description,
identification
of
perpetrator
27%
vary
between
Confirmation of non‐retroactivity
25%
countries.134 While
countries reported
Authenticated statement of facts
23%
both
procedural
Other
18%
and
substantive
Confirmation of complete extent of charge
16%
elements,
dual
Prima‐facie evidence
14%
criminality
was
Minimum penalty
14%
nonetheless
Source: Study cybercrime questionnaire. Q198. (n=44, r=110)
identified
as
a
requirement
for
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
Study cybercrime questionnaire. Q198.
See, for example, Council of Europe Cybercrime Convention, Art. 29(4).
See, for example, Currie, R.J., 2000. Human Rights and International Mutual Legal Assistance: Resolving the Tension. Criminal Law
Forum, 11(2):143-181.
Study cybercrime questionnaire. Q239.
See, for example, Organized Crime Convention, Arts. 2, 3, and 16.
Council of Europe Cybercrime Convention, Art. 24.
Study cybercrime questionnaire. Q194.
For extradition, a copy of the arrest warrant and physical description of the suspect may, for example, be considered as procedural
elements subject to an initial ‘regularity’ check. The existence of dual criminality, on the hand, may be considered in depth at an
extradition hearing before a judicial authority (Response from regional expert nominated by WEOG to preliminary results from the
Study).
204
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