As
regards
the
Figure 7.18: Permissibility of trans‐border access to computer
permissibility of foreign law system or data by foreign law enforcement
enforcement
access
to
computer systems or data,
Europe
Yes
(n=17)
aound two-thirds of countries
No
in all regions of the world
Asia & Oceania
stated that this was not
(n=13)
231
One country
permissible.
Americas
from Oceania, for example,
(n=10)
stated that national law
Africa
enforcement authorities could
(n=7)
‘access computer systems and
computer data on behalf of a foreign
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
country through formal mutual legal
Source: Study cybercrime questionnaire. Q108. (n=47)
assistance processes,’ although the
scope of assistance ‘is limited to situations where a search warrant is executed on [national] premises […],’ and
national authorities are unable ‘to access stored communications on behalf of a foreign country.’232 Other
countries perceived that the practice was incompatible with the principle of sovereignty of states.
Where countries do allow trans-border access to computer systems or data within their territory, this
was often stated to be only as provided for by the Council of Europe Cybercrime Convention. One
country noted that the practice was permissible on the basis of reciprocity. In other cases, such as
for one country in South America, the practice is permissible ‘in urgent cases involving a serious crime that
threatens the integrity or life of a person.’233 Other countries reported that trans-border access was
permissible ‘if the matter threatened national security.’ One country in Northern Europe stated that it will
allow for access ‘if it is impossible to know [in which country] the data actually is.’234
In practice, it appears that when obtaining extra-territorial data, the majority of responding
countries rely on formal channels – necessitating requests for mutual legal assistance.235 Overall, less
than 10 per cent of countries reported ‘most often’ contacting extra-territorial service providers
directly for evidence such as subscriber, traffic or content data.236 One country in Western Asia
observed that initiating contact with an extra-territorial service provider would be carried out in an
informal manner, and, if the provider refused cooperation, law enforcement authorities would revert
to formal channels in order to obtain the necessary permissions and the requested data.237
Conceptualizing direct access to extra-territorial data
In order to conceptualize the considerations involved in access to extra-territorial data
without a formal mutual legal assistance request, or other police-to-police informal cooperation, the
figure below demonstrates four possible scenarios in the context of cloud computing.
The example involves a cloud service provider with head office and data centres in country
B, but with additional data centres in country C, and further offices in country A. Law enforcement
authorities in country A access or receive cloud data believed to be stored in country B, via:
231
232
233
234
235
236
237
Study cybercrime questionnaire. Q108.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Study cybercrime questionnaire. Q105.
Ibid.
Ibid.
220
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