As regards the Figure 7.18: Permissibility of trans‐border access to computer permissibility of foreign law system or data by foreign law enforcement enforcement access to computer systems or data, Europe Yes (n=17) aound two-thirds of countries No in all regions of the world Asia & Oceania stated that this was not (n=13) 231 One country permissible. Americas from Oceania, for example, (n=10) stated that national law Africa enforcement authorities could (n=7) ‘access computer systems and computer data on behalf of a foreign 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% country through formal mutual legal Source: Study cybercrime questionnaire. Q108. (n=47) assistance processes,’ although the scope of assistance ‘is limited to situations where a search warrant is executed on [national] premises […],’ and national authorities are unable ‘to access stored communications on behalf of a foreign country.’232 Other countries perceived that the practice was incompatible with the principle of sovereignty of states. Where countries do allow trans-border access to computer systems or data within their territory, this was often stated to be only as provided for by the Council of Europe Cybercrime Convention. One country noted that the practice was permissible on the basis of reciprocity. In other cases, such as for one country in South America, the practice is permissible ‘in urgent cases involving a serious crime that threatens the integrity or life of a person.’233 Other countries reported that trans-border access was permissible ‘if the matter threatened national security.’ One country in Northern Europe stated that it will allow for access ‘if it is impossible to know [in which country] the data actually is.’234 In practice, it appears that when obtaining extra-territorial data, the majority of responding countries rely on formal channels – necessitating requests for mutual legal assistance.235 Overall, less than 10 per cent of countries reported ‘most often’ contacting extra-territorial service providers directly for evidence such as subscriber, traffic or content data.236 One country in Western Asia observed that initiating contact with an extra-territorial service provider would be carried out in an informal manner, and, if the provider refused cooperation, law enforcement authorities would revert to formal channels in order to obtain the necessary permissions and the requested data.237 Conceptualizing direct access to extra-territorial data In order to conceptualize the considerations involved in access to extra-territorial data without a formal mutual legal assistance request, or other police-to-police informal cooperation, the figure below demonstrates four possible scenarios in the context of cloud computing. The example involves a cloud service provider with head office and data centres in country B, but with additional data centres in country C, and further offices in country A. Law enforcement authorities in country A access or receive cloud data believed to be stored in country B, via: 231 232 233 234 235 236 237 Study cybercrime questionnaire. Q108. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Study cybercrime questionnaire. Q105. Ibid. Ibid. 220

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