CHAPTER SEVEN: INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
(1) An individual located in country A with control over cloud data. Access may be
obtained either because (i) the individual consents; or (ii) authorities make use of an
existing live connection from the individual’s device.
(2) An individual located in country B with control over cloud data. Access may be
obtained due to the consent of the individual.
(3) The cloud service provider in country B. Access may be obtained either because (i) the
cloud service provider consents; or (ii) data access credentials have been obtained by
law enforcement.
(4) The cloud service provider’s offices in country A. Access may be obtained through local
informal arrangements between law enforcement and the cloud service provider.
In all situations, while the data is believed by law enforcement to be held by the cloud
service provider in its data centres in country B, it is also possible that the data, or a copy of it, may
be physically located in country C. In other possible examples, law enforcement authorities in
country A may have no initial information at all about the location of data – including whether it is
physically extra-territorial or not.238
The range of possibilities demonstrates the complexity of law enforcement direct access to
extra-territorial data. Within the example, further nuances also exist, including: (i) the effect of the
cloud service provider’s customer terms and conditions on foreign law enforcement requests; (ii) the
lawfulness in country B of interactions between foreign law enforcement, and individuals and legal
persons within the territory; and (iii) the lawfulness in country A of the way in which any access
credentials are obtained by law enforcement.
Consideration of a range of similar scenarios in a recent report by the Council of Europe
found a number of differences in state approaches. These included with reference to: whether it was
apparent to investigators that data was stored in a different jurisdiction; whether investigators were
permitted to obtain remote access by means of software such as key loggers and sniffers; whether a
238
During ‘live’ access of a suspect’s device for example, it may not be clear whether data is stored (or ‘cached’) locally on the device,
accessed via a network connection to a server within the territory, or accessed via a network connection to a server outside of the
territory.
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