person providing access has lawful authority to dicslose the data under the laws where the data is
stored; and whether it makes a difference if the person providing access is physically located in the
requesting state or extra-territorially.239
Key considerations
The conceptual example considered above, together with the answers of countries to the
Study questionnaire, highlight a number of key considerations.
Firstly, it is apparent that law enforcement authorities may, in practice, directly access extraterritorial data without the consent of either an individual or the service provider. This could occur for
example, where investigators make use of an existing live connection from a suspect’s device, or
where investigators use lawfully obtained data access credentials to access cloud data.
Secondly, law enforcement authorities carrying out such actions will not always know whether
the data access is in fact extra-territorial or, if it is, in which country or countries the data is physically
located. This can occur, for example, where cloud computing providers store data in multiple copies
in data centres in different countries, and make use of dynamic data management between these data
centres.
Both of these points have relevance to existing international and regional approaches such
as the provisions of Article 32(b) of the Council of Europe Cybercrime Convention, and Article
40(2) of the League of Arab States Convention – both of which require the consent of a person who
has lawful authority to disclose the data, and are limited to envisaging access to data located in another
Party. Such provisions would not cover the situation where consent is not obtained and the data is
physically located in a country which is not party to the relevant instrument.
In particular, with respect to the issue of consent and cloud computing providers – many
responding countries indicated that service providers operating within their jurisdiction were only
obliged to disclose data upon receipt of a court order, subpoena or warrant.240 These obligations
apply equally – if not even more so – to foreign law enforcement requests. A number of service
providers that responded to the Study noted that they do not consider informal requests from
foreign law enforcement authorities to generate any obligation to disclose data.241 Overall,
companies that responded to the Study noted that they preferred to receive formal requests through
regimes based on mutual legal assistance treaties. Examination of guidelines from online service
providers also demonstrates this approach. Law enforcement guidelines from Twitter, for example,
state that ‘…law authorizes Twitter to respond to requests for user information from foreign law enforcement agencies
that are issued via …court either by way of a mutual legal assistance treaty or a letter rogatory.’242 As such, foreign
law enforcement authorities may find it challenging to obtain data from an extra-territorial service
provider by direct consent.
The picture adds up to one of a complex balance. On the one hand, some sovereignty and
individual privacy arguments suggest that access to extra-territorial computer data is only
appropriate through mutual legal assistance procedures – which entail formal consideration of such
issues on a case-by-case basis.243 On the other hand, law enforcement realities indicate that, through
239
240
241
242
243
Council of Europe, Cybercrime Convention Committee (T-CY), Ad-hoc Sub-group on Jurisdiction and Transborder Access to
Data, 2012. Transborder access and jurisdiction: What are the options? T-CY (2012)3. 6 December 2012. p.29-31.
Study cybercrime questionnaire. Q21.
Study cybercrime questionnaire (private sector). Q28.
See http://support.twitter.com/articles/41949-guidelines-for-law-enforcement#
This recommendation was made, for example, by Global Network Initiative, 2012. Digital Freedoms in International Law: Practical Steps
to Protect Human Rights Online.
222
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