approaches to cybercrime. It is clear that, in some cases, divergences found at the national level are also present at the international level. Examples of these include the inclusion, or not, of ‘illegal remaining’ in multilateral instruments; the limitation, or not, of interception to ‘non-public’ transmissions; the possibility for criminalization of ‘reckless’ data or system interference; and the inclusion, or exclusion, of ‘access codes’ in computer misuse tool provisions. As discussed in Chapter Three (Legislation and frameworks), it is challenging to trace the exact influence of binding and non-binding instruments on national legislation. It is possible, in some cases, that a two-way process is at work – with national legislative approaches influencing the development of international and regional instruments, and vice versa. While such analysis can be perceived as merely technical, the details of cybercrime criminal offences matter. As discussed in Chapter Seven (International cooperation), for example, in some countries detailed offence aspects such as the ‘use of technical means’ to commit an offence (in the case of illegal interception, for instance) can be considered to be constituent elements of the crime – meaning that there is no crime unless they are present. In such circumstances, the details of the crime can have an impact on requirements for dual criminality and, ultimately, on effective international cooperation. On the other hand, the detailed analysis reveals a number of good practices in the development of criminal laws for cybercrime acts. The creation of a clear distinction in national laws between illegal access to, and interference with¸ computer systems and data, for example, is important in order to ensure that separate acts can be correctly distinguished. The use of aggravating circumstances may be an effective mechanism for tailoring ‘core’ offences to particular national concerns, while maintaining basic offences that can be harmonized with international and regional standards. In order to avoid over-criminalization, many countries ensure that provisions on computer-misuse tools require both that the tool is primarily designed for the commission of an offence, and that the perpetrator intended to use it for such. Requirements of intentionality with respect to illegal interference with computer data and systems are also important for ensuring that negligent or reckless acts are not subject to disproportionate criminal sanctions. The balance of appropriate criminalization is even more challenging with respect to computer content-related offences than it is for offences against the confidentiality, integrity and accessibility of computer systems. Even in an area well covered by international standards such as child pornography, for example, state approaches show divergence with respect to the inclusion, or exclusion, of simulated material, and regarding the age of the child protected. One key external standard that offers guidance in this area is international human rights law. The next section of this Chapter examines the contribution that this body of international law can make in assisting states to achieve an acceptable balance between crime prevention and control, and the protection of individual liberties. 106

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