initially identified at the outset of a case. As noted by one responding country: ‘Some of these [crimes] may be more common [than those reported].’17 Many responding countries reported strategies and approaches used to increase reporting of cybercrime. As shown in Figure 5.2 these include the use of public awareness campaigns, creation of online and hotline reporting systems, liaison with private sector organizations, and enhanced police outreach and information sharing. Out of almost 60 Figure 5.2: Measures taken to increase reporting of cybercrime to police responding countries, less 28% than 10 per cent reported Public Awareness not having taken any measures aimed at 14% Hotlines & Online Portals increasing reporting of Public‐Private cybercrime acts.18 Liaison/Cooperation Enhanced Police Response Country 14% responses also showed the No Measures Taken 38% need for law enforcement 6% authorities to work closely Source: Study cybercrime questionnaire. Q79. (n=57, r=107) with other stakeholders, such as the private sector – in order to increase reporting and for intelligence purposes. One country, for example, highlighted that it was important to ‘establish 24 hour connectivity between important website administrators, ISPs, police and a centre for coordination of security incidents.’ Another country in the Americas reported that ‘The Federal Police is pursuing agreements with public and private companies so that crimes committed against those companies and their clients are informed electronically to the Federal Police.’19 Overall, however, the comparatively low proportion of cybercrime acts reported by company victims or internet service providers, suggests that additional outreach and development of publicprivate partnerships may be needed, in order to strengthen reporting of cybercrime acts from these sources. The development of public-private partnerships and service provider responsibilities is discussed further in Chapter Eight (Prevention). Interactions between law enforcement and third party service providers during police investigations are addressed below in this Chapter. A notable feature from Figure 5.1 is the low proportion of cybercrime acts that are detected by law enforcement investigators in the absence of victim reports. Accordingly, responding countries did not, in general, refer to proactive investigations in written responses to the questionnaire. One country did, however, note that ‘In some cases cybercrime acts come to the attention of the police while police [are] performing operational activities.’20 Another country, in Europe, also reported that ‘For child pornography offences, the investigations start mostly from information coming from other police forces, and open sources,’ indicating underlying police intelligence work. The distribution of the source of identified cybercrime acts is indicative, in part, of the challenge of addressing both strategic and tactical policing objectives. Strategic policing objectives are threat-driven and relate to longer-term law enforcement goals, with a focus on the root causes and circumstances of serious crime. Tactical policing objectives are incident-driven and time-sensitive, with an emphasis on preserving evidence and following investigative leads. In the case of cybercrime, the investment in police time and resources required for responding to individual cases 17 18 19 20 Study cybercrime questionnaire. Q80. Study cybercrime questionnaire. Q79. Study cybercrime questionnaire. Q79. Study cybercrime questionnaire. Q78. 120

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