CHAPTER FIVE: LAW ENFORCEMENT AND INVESTIGATIONS is substantial. As discussed later in this Chapter, many countries highlighted the voluminous amounts of evidence associated with cybercrime investigations and the time consuming nature of investigations into reported cases. One country in the Americas, for example, stated that ‘the complexity of cybercrime offences and cybercrime elements of traditional offences has increased significantly, which places additional demands for the training and maintenance of highly-skilled investigators and technical experts, and also increases the amounts of time that need to be spent on individual cases.’21 In many countries, law enforcement agency capacity is fully occupied with day-to-day cases. In response to questions on law enforcement capacity for forensic investigations, for example, one country in Africa reported that ‘A few forensic examiners/investigators are available at the Federal level, but not enough to serve the whole country. Only one laboratory is functional.’22 Another country in the Americas highlighted that ‘The challenge is not in the expertise, but the quantity of data that must be analysed.’23 The nature of forensic investigations, and law enforcement capacity in this area, is discussed in detail in Chapter Six (Electronic evidence and criminal justice). In addition to the challenge of capacity and resources, the extent to which proactive cybercrime investigations can be undertaken by law enforcement may also be affected by underlying differences between common and civil law systems regarding prosecutorial and judicial oversight over the initial stages of an investigation,24 as well as the extent to which intrusive investigative measures can be authorized in intelligence-based or prospective investigations. As discussed in this Chapter, cybercrime investigations often make use of tools, including interception of communications and electronic surveillance, which have the potential to infringe upon privacy-based rights. Countries with international human rights law commitments will need to ensure a proportionate balance between protection of privacy, and infringements for legitimate crime prevention and control purposes. The section below on privacy and investigations examines this area in greater depth. Nonetheless, law enforcement authorities in developed countries, and also in a number of developing countries, are engaged in medium and long-term strategic investigations. These often involve undercover units targeting offenders on social networking sites, chat rooms, and instant messaging and P2P services. Examples include the infiltration or establishment of online ‘carding’ forums,25 the forensic examination of forums used by child pornography offenders,26 the use of law enforcement officers posing as minors online,27 and the examination of malware command and control servers.28 Many of these investigations involve multiple law enforcement agencies and a large range of investigative measures, including those carried out pursuant to judicial authority, such as search or interception orders. Indeed, both strategic and tactical investigations require access to a range of investigative powers, which – in accordance with rule of law principles – must be firmly grounded in legal authority. The next section of this Chapter examines typical cybercrime investigative powers found in international and regional instruments, and in national laws. 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Study cybercrime questionnaire. Q84. Study cybercrime questionnaire. Q110. Ibid. See, for example, INPROL. 2012. Practitioner’s Guide: Common Law and Civil Law Traditions. See http://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2008/october/darkmarket_102008 and http://www.fbi.gov/newyork/pressreleases/2012/manhattan-u.s.-attorney-and-fbi-assistant-director-in-charge-announce-24-arrests-in-eight-countries-as-part-ofinternational-cyber-crime-takedown See https://www.europol.europa.eu/sites/default/files/publications/2csefactsheet2012_0.pdf See http://cdrc.jhpolice.gov.in/cyber-crime/ See http://www.justice.gov/usao/nys/pressreleases/January13/GoziVirusDocuments/Kuzmin,%20Nikita%20Complaint.pdf 121

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