5.2 Investigative powers overview KEY RESULTS:  Many countries outside of Europe perceive their national legal frameworks to be insufficient for the investigation of cybercrime  Overall, national approaches to cybercrime investigative powers show less core commonality than for criminalization  While legal approaches vary, key investigative powers required include search and seizure, orders for computer data, real-time collection of data, and data preservation  Across ten investigative measures, countries most often reported the existence of general (non-cyber-specific) powers. A number of countries reported cyber-specific legislation, notably for ensuring expedited preservation of computer data and for obtaining stored subscriber data  Many countries reported a lack of legal power for advanced investigative measures, such as remote computer forensics Cyber-specific and general investigative powers The evidence of cybercrime acts is almost always in electronic, or digital, form. This data can be stored or transient, and can exist in the form of computer files, transmissions, logs, metadata, or network data. Obtaining such evidence requires an amalgamation of traditional and new policing techniques. Law enforcement authorities may use ‘traditional’ police work (interviewing victims or undercover visual surveillance of suspects) in some stages of an investigation, but require computer-specific approaches for other parts. These can include viewing, and seizing or copying, computer data from devices belonging to suspects; obtaining computer data from third parties such as internet service providers, and – where necessary – intercepting electronic communications. While some of these investigative actions can be achieved with traditional powers, many procedural provisions do not translate well from a spatial, object-oriented approach to one involving electronic data storage and real-time data flows. In some countries, computer data can be covered by ‘traditional’ powers of search and seizure of ‘anything’ believed to be relevant to an offence. Existing ‘wiretap’ or ‘communications interception’ laws may also provide sufficient authority for some aspects of cybercrime investigations. In other countries, however, traditional procedural laws might not be capable of being interpreted to include intangible data or IP-based communications. In addition, investigative powers must be able to address challenges such as the volatile nature of electronic evidence, and use of obfuscation techniques by perpetrators – including the use of encryption, proxies, cloud computing service, ‘innocent’ computer systems infected with malware, and multiple (or ‘onion’) routing of internet connections.29 These aspects, in particular, 29 See, for example, Feigenbaum et al., 2007. A Model of Onion Routing with Provable Anonymity. Financial Cryptography and Data Security Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 4886:57-71; and Schwerha, J.J., 2010. Law Enforcement Challenges in Transborder Acquisition of Electronic Evidence from “Cloud Computing Providers,” Council of Europe Discussion paper, pp.9-10; Walden, I., 2013. Accessing Data in the Cloud: The Long Arm of the Law Enforcement Agent. Privacy and Security for Cloud Computing. Computer Communications and 122

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