countries rely on general legal powers for the investigation of cybercrime. This is the case across a
range of investigative actions, including search, seizure, orders for data addressed to third parties,
real-time collection of data, and orders for preservation of data. For more intrusive, complex,
investigative measures such as remote computer forensics, almost half of responding countries
indicated that such measures were not authorized by law. Around 20 per cent of countries reported
that no legal power existed for real-time collection of computer data, or for ordering expedited
preservation of computer data. Even for basic search and seizure of computer hardware or data, 10
per cent of countries reported that no legal power existed.
Countries that reported the existence of cyber-specific powers showed broad geographic
distribution throughout Europe, North and South America, the Caribbean, Western and SouthEastern Asia, the Caribbean, and Northern and Western Africa. Investigative actions most often
covered by cyber-specific provisions were orders for subscriber data and for expedited preservation
of data – with around 25 to 30 per cent of responding countries reporting the existence of cyberspecific provisions in these areas. The actions of search and seizure for computer hardware and data
are most often covered by both cyber-specific and general provisions – a situation reported by
around 20 per cent of responding countries.
Sufficiency of investigative powers for cybercrime
With respect to the
perceived sufficiency of investigative
powers, country responses to the
Study questionnaire showed a similar
pattern to that for criminalization
laws. Around 70 per cent of
responding countries from Europe
reported that investigative powers
were sufficient. The remainder
viewed investigative powers as
sufficient ‘in part,’ with only one
country indicating that powers were
insufficient. In other regions of the
world, between 20 and 65 per cent
of
countries
reported
that
investigative
powers
were
insufficient.
Figure 5.4: Sufficiency of national law for cybercrime investigations
Europe
(n=19)
Asia & Oceania
(n=20)
Sufficient
Sufficient in part
Not sufficient
Americas
(n=9)
Africa
(n=6)
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
Source: Study cybercrime questionnaire. Q53. (n=54)
When asked about the main gaps in investigative powers, many countries referred to a lack
of power to ‘enter’ electronic networks in order to search for evidence, as well as a lack of power for
preservation of computer data. Countries from Oceania and Europe reported that there was a need
for a ‘mechanism to expeditiously preserve computer data to support existing search powers,’ and one country in
South America highlighted that there was a ‘lack of regulation on access to data and connection logs [as well as
a] lack of regulation on virtual search possibilities.’34
On the other hand, while many countries reported a complete lack of legal framework
specific to cybercrime, a few countries also cited the successful extension of general powers. One
country in Southern Africa, for example, reported that ‘the Criminal Procedure Act allows the State to seize
34
Ibid.
124
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