countries rely on general legal powers for the investigation of cybercrime. This is the case across a range of investigative actions, including search, seizure, orders for data addressed to third parties, real-time collection of data, and orders for preservation of data. For more intrusive, complex, investigative measures such as remote computer forensics, almost half of responding countries indicated that such measures were not authorized by law. Around 20 per cent of countries reported that no legal power existed for real-time collection of computer data, or for ordering expedited preservation of computer data. Even for basic search and seizure of computer hardware or data, 10 per cent of countries reported that no legal power existed. Countries that reported the existence of cyber-specific powers showed broad geographic distribution throughout Europe, North and South America, the Caribbean, Western and SouthEastern Asia, the Caribbean, and Northern and Western Africa. Investigative actions most often covered by cyber-specific provisions were orders for subscriber data and for expedited preservation of data – with around 25 to 30 per cent of responding countries reporting the existence of cyberspecific provisions in these areas. The actions of search and seizure for computer hardware and data are most often covered by both cyber-specific and general provisions – a situation reported by around 20 per cent of responding countries. Sufficiency of investigative powers for cybercrime With respect to the perceived sufficiency of investigative powers, country responses to the Study questionnaire showed a similar pattern to that for criminalization laws. Around 70 per cent of responding countries from Europe reported that investigative powers were sufficient. The remainder viewed investigative powers as sufficient ‘in part,’ with only one country indicating that powers were insufficient. In other regions of the world, between 20 and 65 per cent of countries reported that investigative powers were insufficient. Figure 5.4: Sufficiency of national law for cybercrime investigations Europe (n=19) Asia & Oceania (n=20) Sufficient Sufficient in part Not sufficient Americas (n=9) Africa (n=6) 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% Source: Study cybercrime questionnaire. Q53. (n=54) When asked about the main gaps in investigative powers, many countries referred to a lack of power to ‘enter’ electronic networks in order to search for evidence, as well as a lack of power for preservation of computer data. Countries from Oceania and Europe reported that there was a need for a ‘mechanism to expeditiously preserve computer data to support existing search powers,’ and one country in South America highlighted that there was a ‘lack of regulation on access to data and connection logs [as well as a] lack of regulation on virtual search possibilities.’34 On the other hand, while many countries reported a complete lack of legal framework specific to cybercrime, a few countries also cited the successful extension of general powers. One country in Southern Africa, for example, reported that ‘the Criminal Procedure Act allows the State to seize 34 Ibid. 124

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