CHAPTER FIVE: LAW ENFORCEMENT AND INVESTIGATIONS In many countries, such orders may be possible under existing investigative powers, such as general production orders, or document disclosure orders. Nonetheless, procedural challenges can also arise. These could include in respect of ‘traditional’ requirements for identifying information about a suspect before orders for evidence can be made. In cybercrime investigations, at the time of request to an internet service provider, the only known information may be an IP-address or similar connection-based information. Order for computer data: National example from a country in the Americas If a magistrate is satisfied on the basis of an application by a police officer that specified computer data, or a printout or other information, is reasonably required for the purpose of a criminal investigation or criminal proceedings, the magistrate may order that(a) a person in the territory of <country> in control of a computer produce from the computer specified data or a printout or other intelligible output of that data; (b) an Internet service provider in <country> produce information about persons who subscribe to or otherwise use the service; or (c) a person in the territory of <country> who has access to a specified computer process and compile specified computer data from the computer and give it to a specified person Accordingly, five international or regional cybercrime instruments contain specific provisions regarding orders for obtaining stored data.51 In doing so, instruments typically refer to the distinction made earlier in this Chapter – between ‘subscriber’, ‘traffic’, and ‘content’ data. Such provisions usually concern information that are in the ‘possession or control’ of the person or service provider. The order only applies therefore, to the extent that the data are in existence at the time of the order, and can be retrieved by the subject of the order. The existence of such investigative powers alone does not in itself oblige service providers to collect or retain information they would not otherwise so process. In respect of traffic data, some multilateral instruments52 also include a mechanism for ‘partial’ expeditious disclosure of sufficient traffic data to enable law authorities to identify the service providers and the path through which the communication was transmitted. This can be important where multiple service providers are involved in processing computer data or electronic communications. Figure 5.7 shows that at the national level, general powers are again predominant amongst countries for the authorization of orders for subscriber, traffic, and content data.53 The proportion of countries that employ Figure 5.7: Order for stored traffic, subcriber and content data cyber-specific orders for obtaining subscriber data is Traffic data slightly higher than for the (n=50) other two data categories. In addition to the influence of Cyber‐specific powers international and regional Subscriber data (n=49) General powers cybercrime instruments, this Both may also reflect a common Neither need for this type of data, Content data (n=50) and a requirement on behalf of service providers for clear legal powers and 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% procedures in requesting Source: Study cybercrime questionnaire. Q44, Q45, and Q46. (n=50, 49, 50) 51 52 53 COMESA Draft Model Bill, Art. 36(a); Commonwealth Model Law, Art.15; Council of Europe Cybercrime Convention, Art. 18(1)(a); ITU/CARICOM/CTU Model Legislative Texts, Art.22(a); League of Arab States Convention, Art. 25(1). COMESA Draft Model Bill, Art. 34(a)(ii); Commonwealth Model Law, Art.16; Council of Europe Cybercrime Convention, Art. 17(1)(b); ITU/CARICOM/CTU Model Legislative Texts, Art.24; League of Arab States Convention, Art. 24. Study cybercrime questionnaire. Q45-47. 129

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