CHAPTER FIVE: LAW ENFORCEMENT AND INVESTIGATIONS
data. In recognition of this challenge, three international or regional instruments contain provisions
on ‘trans-border’ access to computer data.67 Such provisions typically envisage that law enforcement
authorities may access or receive, through a computer system in the national territory, stored
computer data located in another country, with the lawful and voluntary consent of a person who
has lawful authority to disclose the data.68
As with remote forensic tools, over one-third of responding countries did not respond to
the
question
in
the
Study
Figure 5.10: Trans‐border access to a computer system
questionnaire on existence of powers
or data
for ‘trans-border’ access. Of those
13%
that did, slightly more than half
33%
Cyber‐specific powers
indicated that such a power existed.
Countries interpreted the term
General powers
widely, however, to also include the
Both
situation where consent to the
Neither
44%
measure is obtained from the
10%
authorities of the country in which
the measure is implemented. One
Source: Study cybercrime questionnaire. Q51. (n=39)
country, for example, reported that
legislation allows for the issue of a warrant permitting the installation of surveillance devices in
‘overseas premises/objects.’ However, this can only be done where a ‘judge… issuing the warrant is satisfied
that the surveillance has been agreed to by an ‘appropriate consenting official’ of the foreign country.’69 Some
countries that indicated ‘trans-border’ access powers in national law, referred in written comments
to the use of mutual legal assistance instruments. Thus, the overall proportion of countries reporting
legislative authority for ‘trans-border’ access through the Study questionnaire, may be larger than the
group of countries with the power to authorize ‘trans-border’ access in the stricter sense (ie. without
authorization from national authorities) envisaged by some international and regional instruments.
Chapter Seven (International cooperation) examines issues of direct law enforcement access to
extraterritorial data in greater depth – including with reference to police use of such measures in
practice.
Discussion
Examination of the legal basis for investigative powers used in cybercrime (and, indeed, for
any crime involving electronic evidence) reveals considerable diversity in approach at national level.
This includes regarding the extent to which ‘traditional’ powers can be interpreted to apply to nontangible data, as well as the extent to which legal authority exists for particularly intrusive measures,
such as remote forensic investigations. Overall, national approaches to cybercrime investigative
powers show less core commonality than for criminalization of many cybercrime acts. Nonetheless,
while legal powers vary, a good degree of consensus appears to exist on the types of investigative
measure that should be available. These are comparatively straight forward and correspond to those
found in many multilateral instruments – (i) powers for search and seizure; (ii) powers for obtaining
67
68
69
See COMESA Draft Model Bill, Art. 49b; Council of Europe Cybercrime Convention, Art. 32b; League of Arab States
Convention, Art. 40(2).
‘Trans-border’ access provisons typically distinguish between access to publicly available (open source) material and other material.
Access to open source material for criminal justice purposes has become generally accepted practice (See Council of Europe. 2012.
Transborder access and jurisdiction: what are the options? Report of the Transborder Group Adopted by the T-CY on 6 December 2012). Use of the
term ‘Trans-border’ access in this Study therefore concerns access to non-open source material.
Study cybercrime questionnaire. Q42-51.
133
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